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The General Editor,
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Telephone (202) 371-2700
Fax (202) 371-1523
E-mail SOCECON@AOL.COM

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The Journal of SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Roger Pearson
General Editor
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Associate Editor

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CONTENTS

Arab Attitudes Toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium
Hilal Khashan 131

Chinese Space Power of the United States?
James H. Hughes 231

Global War and the Human Population Problem
Joseph Barter 241

Book Reviews
Cultural Amnesia: America's Future and the Crisis of Memory
A Republic, Not an Empire
Dwight D. Murphey 251

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Arab Attitudes Toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium

Hilal Khashan
American University of Beirut

The author reports on a study of Arab attitudes towards Israel, Israelis and the Middle East peace negotations, based on an opinion survey of Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians representing diverse socio-economic levels and different degrees of Islamic religious conviction. The results are analyzed on a multivariate basis and presented together with the author's comments.

Key Words: The Middle East peace process, Arab, Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian public opinion, Islam, Israel.

A series of peace agreements (Camp David, two Declarations of Principles, Oslo and Cairo Agreements, and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty) have changed the contours of the most persistent conflict in the twentieth century. The virtual disappearance of official Arab bellicosity and introduction of the language of dialog, appear to be reshaping, not dissipating the conflict. Arab opponents of peace have revised their terminology on the conflict and identified new icons to keep it going. Arab societies have added new terms to their political dictionary. Thus concepts such as normalization, Jewish settlement, Jewish arrogance, Palestinian resettlement, suicide bombings, and Katyusha barrages have become household terms in the Arab World.

Encouraged by the beginning of appearingly serious peace talks in the 1990s, a vast literature emerged on how to transform political peace into one based on common interests. In this venue, the multilateral talks aimed at minimizing political differences by bringing to the attention of Middle Eastern countries several issues requiring immediate cooperation (the issues pertained to economy, environment, water, refugees, etc.). Of course, the multilaterals did not go very far in bringing Arabs and Israelis together, despite noisy media coverage. No matter how one looks at regional cooperation it is essentially people, not rulers, who can make it happen.

This study seeks to examine what ordinary Arabs think about

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peace with the Jewish state, not what their leaders say about it. In part, the author intends to determine if Arab publics register significant attitudinal change with regard to the conflict with Israel since the public opinion polls he conducted before and after the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake in 1993. Previous results were very discouraging as the majority of Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinian respondents seemed opposed to peace. They saw possible peace agreements as temporary arrangements, and expressed confidence that the Arab-Israeli conflict would continue until the elimination of Israel.

Apart from revisiting the previous findings, the present study endeavors to identify key variables that contribute to the formation of Arab attitudes toward the Jewish state and perceptions on peace with Israelis. Furthermore, it aspires to locate behavioral variables capable of making Arab publics more predisposed toward peace.

Globalization and Prospects for Peace between Arabs and Jews

The signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO in Washington, on September 13, 1993 formalized the results of the Oslo talks between the two sides. An historic event, the DOP symbolized a change of seasons from confrontation to negotiation in solving many outstanding crises that disturbed the world peace during the defunct period of superpower rivalry. The new international climate favored interstate communication, privatization, economic integration, democratization and political transparency. Rapid transition from belligerency to peace necessitated widespread cognitive, affective and evaluative changes to provide a behavioral momentum to legal accords, without which the chances of durable peace remained doubtful.

Arab states found themselves besieged by incalculable social, political and economic problems. Ruling elites no longer capable of managing the inherent problems of their countries saw in peace with the Hebrew state a lesser evil, now that their tight grip on society steadily began to loosen. Late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to this conclusion in the early 1970s, and decided to pursue peace as

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soon as possible.[1] Obviously, Egypt's homogeneous society and fairly institutionalized political system facilitated Sadat's peace endeavor. Sadat wanted to develop Egypt; he was disillusioned about the willingness of the oil-rich Arab countries to come to Egypt's rescue. He went to the other extreme and thought, almost compulsively, that peace would provide the panacea to his country's economic woes. But there were no magic solutions to Egypt's deep-seated economic travails. Frustrated Egyptians soon understood that peace by itself could not alleviate their economic dilemma. It became evident that there was no alternative to a long and painful mechanism of far-reaching economic, political and bureaucratic reforms.

Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian leaders eagerly wanted peace with the Jewish state, but sought to minimize their losses.[2] Jordanian and Palestinian leaders spoke about the dividends of peace in a tone reminiscent of Sadat's. It seemed that they wanted to convince their populations that the imagined dividends outweighed in importance the unpopular territorial and sovereignty compromises. Arab leaders' drive to bring about peace proved far more difficult in the 1990s than it was for Egypt in the 1970s. This is attributable to a number of complex, possibly interactive factors.

The Land Factor: The lands of Sinai did not present an insurmountable obstacle in securing peace between Egypt and Israel. Israel occupied Sinai three times (in 1948, 1956, and 1967), but since the Hebrew state did not seem fixed on this desert peninsula, probably for reasons that lie outside the scope of this study), returning land to Egypt proceeded with little difficulty.The issue of land in the West bank (which Israelis prefer to refer to as Judaea and Samaria) and Golan Heights has been far more complex,

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[1] Even since Sadat became President in 1970, he made it clear in his public appearances that the U.S. provided the key to peace between Arabs and Jews. In allusion to the former Soviet Union's lack of influence in contributing to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sadat used to say that the U.S. controlled 99 percent of the cards to peace in the Middle East.

[2] Peace accords entail compromises, especially by the weaker parties. Arab leaders realized that they had no option other than peace, but aspired to minimize its costs to them. Syrian President Hafiz Asad has repeatedly said that the Arab position in the peace negotiations has been weak to begin with. He stated that his objective was to obtain the best deal, considering the situation.

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controversial and emotional for the involved parties than Sinai had. In this instance, the Israeli perspective grew from religio-historical, economic and strategic considerations.

The U.S. Factor: The signing of the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt would not have been possible without direct involvement by U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Camp David Agreement broke the peace taboo for many Arabs, and underscored a major foreign policy victory for President Carter during the period of superpower rivalry. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the consolidation of U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf in the wake of Desert Storm which led to the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait relegated the region's conflicts to a lower intensity status among U.S. policy makers.[3]

The Arab Need Factor: Israel want peace, no doubt. The landslide victory of Ehud Barak at the polls in the spring of 1999, giving the salience of peace in his electoral platform, clearly demonstrates the predisposition of most Israelis toward the resolution of conflict with Arabs. However, peace is primarily an Arab need, at least at the level of political elites. In the current age of globalization Arab regimes face daunting challenges: the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, political illegitimacy, the issue of power transfer (succession), elusive economic development, the democratization nightmare and last but not least, rising ethnic/religious minority tensions. A myriad of domestic problems have further weakened Arab peace negotiating position. Opaque political horizon in most Arab countries (namely those near Israel: Syria, Jordan, Iraq and even Egypt) and lingering militant Islamic threat have exacerbated Israel's preoccupation with security.[4] But Arab leaders, not publics, understand quite well that the civilized world nowadays no longer tolerates bellicose statements, expecting moderation and sensibility instead. Although Arab leaders

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[3] U.S. officials, including the President himself, repeat stating that it is up to the concerned countries in the region, not outside powers, to negotiate the terms of peace between Arabs and Israelis.

[4] Arabs do not adequately comprehend Israel's security concerns. Arab leaders and publics feel that Israelis are insincere in continuously raising the security dimension in peace talks with Arabs, often considering it a ploy to grab as much Arab land as possible.

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appear interested in peace, they realize that they have very few bargaining cards at hand. The Arab leaders' seeming understanding that they ought not to obstruct the march of peace by no means indicates abandonment of the perception of politics as the accumulation of as much power as possible. They do continue to perceive their countries' relations with the Jewish state as adversarial, and tend to discourage mutual interaction.[5] In an alarming note on what may be in store for interstate interactions in the Middle East, Francis Fukuyama observed in his celebrated study that:

> Power politics continues to prevail among states that are not liberal democracies. The relatively late arrival of industrialization and nationalism to the Third World will lead to a sharp distinction between the behavior of much of the Third World, on the one hand, and of the industrial democracies on the other. For the foreseeable future, the world will be divided between a post-historical part, and a part that is still stuck in history.... The historical world will still be riven with a variety of religious, national, and ideological conflicts depending on the stage of development of the particular countries concerned, in which the old rules of power politics continue to apply.[6]

Fukuyama's outlook has serious implications for peace in the Middle East. Needless to say, the vast majority of the region's leaders and populations continue to evince strong historical memories and sail in nostalgic thoughts.

Evolution of the Study

The present study has an antecedent. In 1996, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) published a study for this author in which Arab respondents (Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians) expressed generally negative views about peace with the

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[5] For example, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak feels that the modernization of Egypt can be achieved with little or no cooperation with Israel. In fact, he is charting for his country an economic path that does not notice significant interaction with its only non-Arab contiguous neighbor.

[6] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 276.

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Jewish state.[7] It compared poll results for two studies respectively conducted in 1993 and 1994. The majority of respondents disapproved of peace; most of supportive respondents indicated lack of commitment to it, predicting its eventual demise.[8] Only a very small minority chose to support peace for the sake of it, whereas most others reported a variety of misgivings about real Israeli intentions from peace, ranging from conspiracy to blunt accusations of scheming to control the region's economies and meager water resources.[9] The vast majority of respondents chose to refuse to involve themselves in all suggested aspects of normalization of relations (economic cooperation, tourism, cultural interaction, etc.)[10]

Selective Review of Literature on Peace

The initial shock generated by the DOP widened, nevertheless, the split in Arab ranks with regards to the merits of peace with Israel, which followed the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. Using data collected in the state of Kuwait in mid-1988 (consisting of Kuwaiti, Egyptian and Palestinian respondents), Mark Tessler and Jamal Sanad found out that the Egyptians were clearly more likely to endorse the principle of peace with Israel than the Palestinians or even the Kuwaitis. Egyptian attitudes toward peace seemed influenced by political views and economic situation, whereas in the case of Kuwaiti and Palestinian respondents religious and cultural variables played a more decisive role. Economically disadvantaged Egyptians, as well as those opposed to the political orientation of the government, expressed opposition to peace. On the other hand, religious and moderately educated Kuwaitis and Palestinians expressed stronger anti-peace sentiment than their irreligious and highly educated counterparts.[11] The authors claimed, without

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[7] Hilal Khashan, *Partner or Pariah? Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy paper # 41, 1996).

[8] Ibid., 17.

[9] Ibid., 20.

[10] Ibid., 23-33.

[11] Mark Tessler and Jamal Sanad, "Will Arab Public Accept Peace with Israel? Evidence from Surveys in Three Arab Societies," in Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace* (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 65-70.

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substantiation, that these attitudes were "situationally conditioned rather than inherent."[12] One can hardly attribute the endurance of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the situational effect. Admittedly, the situation may exacerbate or alleviate the intensity of opposition to rapprochement with the Jewish state, but the underlying factors are better explained in terms of ideology and religious fervor.

Since the DOP the peace process between Israel and the PLO hit a snag due to a rise in Palestinian terrorism and Israeli conservatism. The Israelis have been less than forthcoming in relinquishing land to the Palestinian Authority, which could not succeed in fully neutralizing the militant *Hamas* and *Jihad* groups. Palestinians complain that even though Israel has pulled out its troops from Gaza and around Jericho, military occupation has not significantly changed since the DOP. The building of settlements, and other complications, have not yet paved the way for constructive final status talks. The successful conclusion of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty has left many Jordanians frustrated because they were expecting more tangible dividends from peace. The breakup in negotiations along the Syrian track added to the frustrations of Arabs, especially those who opted for peace with Israel as a strategic choice. Lack of progress in Arab democratization and stagnant economic conditions have further deligitimized Arab regimes, thus fomenting the potential for more serious religious radicalism, the primary enemy of peace.

Many Arabs readily blame the U.S. for the lack of progress in activating the peace talks and tackling the yet unresolved problems with Israel. Even Arabs predisposed to peace seem to view the matter of peace as something that has to be handled by the U.S. There is a general impression that by accepting peace, Arabs would be doing the U.S. a favor. Robert Anderson, U.S. envoy for peace in the Middle East during the mid-1950s, tried to convince Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser to lead the Arab states in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bemused Nasser responded noncooperatively:

> You always talk about problems with Israel as if they were our own problems. In fact, the problems are yours and you ought to solve them and not us. Our only role would be to assist you in

[12] Ibid., 70.

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swaying the Arab countries to agree to a negotiated settlement.[13]

Reliance on the U.S. to bring about peace also was voiced by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, who insisted that U.S. president Jimmy Carter exercises the role of an impartial arbiter and honest broker during the talks in Camp David. The same words have been repeated by Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, in his pleas for a more active U.S. role to pressure Israel to soften its negotiating position. This attitude towards peace partially demonstrates Israel's military preponderance, but also the lack of genuine interest in peace. At best, it is seen as an unpalatable – yet unavoidable – exercise that must be undertaken, preferably with the help of a major power.

In a daring booklet defending peace, Hazim Saghiyya lashed out at Arab passivity with regards to peace with Israel. Viewing it as objectionable, Saghiyya charged that Arabs came to the negotiating table as someone summoned to the court.[14] He reproved Arabs for rejecting normalization and condemned the attribution of heroism to terrorists killing Israeli tourists and schoolgirls.[15] He spoke strongly about the need for Arabs to understand Jewish history, especially the Holocaust, with compassion, viewing it as quite important, if not for the sake of good neighborly relations, at least from a humanistic viewpoint.[16] In a rather remarkable shift in Arab thinking, Saghiyya recognized that Arabs must address the Israelis' genuine security concerns.[17]

Shifting from War to Peace:
Stating the Objective of the Study

The Arab publics' overall inclination to distance themselves from peace and its obligations has not prevented officials on both sides of the conflict from proceeding with marathon peace talks. Despite

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[13] Fadia Siraj al-Din, "Al-Masa'i al-Amrikiyya wa al-Baritaniyya li Tahqiq al-Salam fi al-Sharq al-Awsat 1954-56," in 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, ed., *Masa'i al-Salam al-'Arabiyya al-Isra'iliyya: Al-'Ususl al-Tarikhiyya* (Cairo: Al-Hai'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma li al-Kitab, 1993), 89.

[14] Hazim Saghiyya, *Difa'an 'an al-Salam* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1997), 57.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 64.

[17] Ibid., 98.

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unyielding polar negotiation positions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the suspension of talks on the Syrian-Israeli track during the three years of Benjamin Netanyahu's Premiership, the peace process seems to have received a major boost with the election of Ehud Barak as Israel's new Prime Minister in the spring of 1999. Repudiation of military force by Arab and Israeli officials as a viable option to settle their conflict – in an era of international relations that places a premium on the peaceful resolution of conflict – seems to suggest the irreversibility of shifting from war to peace, notwithstanding spasmodic violence. Even though the realization of the last phases of peace between Arabs and Israelis is only a matter of time, its concretization is another matter.

This study seeks to investigate the cognitive, affective and evaluative aspects of peace with the Jewish state as viewed by Arab public opinion, and further develop previous research instruments, five years after the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake at the White House lawn. It differs from the previous WINEP publication in that, in addition to reexamining Arab perceptions of peace with the Jewish state, it attempts to understand the environment which gives shape and meaning to the attitudes and behaviors of respondents. Analysis will look into the possible impact of religiosity and socioeconomic variable on attitudes towards the peace process. Furthermore, the study will examine whether attitudes towards peace are situational or inherent. The following components satisfy the objective of the present study:

(1) Identity orientation and globalization,
(2) Agents of attitude formation toward Israel,
(3) Attitudes toward national government,[18]
(4) Perceptions about the intensity, scope and future of the conflict,
(5) Primary attitudes toward peace,[19]
(6) Peace-related attributes of conspiracy thinking,

[18] This is a critical variable because respondents holding negative perceptions about their ruling elite are unlikely to endorse their signature to peace treaties.

[19] This variable involves (a) Leaders' predisposition toward peace, (b) Publics' predisposition toward peace, (c) Desired scope of relations with Israel, (d) Perceptions about durability of peace, (e) Reasons for supporting peace and; (f) Alternatives to peace.

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(7) Support for Islamic militancy,
(8) Building bridges with Israelis (economic, touristic and cultural interactions, as well as good neighborly relations),
(9) Peace promoters[20] and;
(10) The role of the U.S. in promoting peace.

The Making of Attitudes

Referring to it as a state of mind, James Vander Zanden defined an attitude, which entails favorable or unfavorable responses as "... a learned and relatively enduring tendency or predisposition to evaluate a person, event, or situation in a certain way and to act in accordance with that evaluation."[21] Aggregate attitudes do not develop in a vacuum; they are largely a reflection of a group's political culture and collective experiences, remote and recent. This section performs two functions: (1) it quickly draws on the literature of attitude formation and; (2) points to the general features of Arab personality as suggested by reliable references.

There are two broad categories of attitudes, individual and collective. In the former, one forms his/her attitudes independently of others, depending on how they evaluate the situation. In the latter, the attitudes of the community are accepted by its members unquestioningly. This does not imply that individual perceptions of a particular situation do not give rise to collective attitudes. In this instance, a collective attitude demonstrates consensus by group members, not the result of any form of imposition. In Western societies, the individual forms the basic building block both of society and public opinion. It is difficult to imagine a democratic polity in which the individual is not sufficiently aware of his/her societal duties and rights. Colin Morris explained how Westerners take individualism for granted. He said:

> We think of ourselves as people with frontiers, our personalities divided from each other as our bodies visibly are. Whatever ties of love or loyalty may bind us to other people, we are aware that there

[20] This variable locates, and analyzes, cracks in the wall of Arab opposition to interaction with Israelis.

[21] James W. Vander Zanden, *Social psychology* (New York: Random House, 1987), 173-74.

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> is an inner being of our own; that we are individuals. To the Western reader it may come as a surprise that there is anything unusual in this experience. It is to us a matter of common sense that we stand apart from the natural order in which we are set... and that we have our own distinct personality, beliefs, and attitudes to life.[22]

Finding individualism a distinct Western property, he noted that in tribal societies, for example, a child "find[s] his identity, not in anything peculiar to himself, but in the common mind of his people."[23] Morris linked this acute self-awareness that prevails in Western societies to Christianity, finding it "implicit in a God who has called each man by name."[24]

Bernd Simon avoided the controversy of inconclusively associating between individualism and religion, connecting it, instead, with development.[25] He viewed individualism as resulting from "....division of labour, urbanization, mass communication, literacy... nation-building... social permeability and mobility, formal equality, individualized interests and universalistic competition..."[26] The survival of traditional behavior not only inhibits the rise of individualism, but also accentuates stereotyping. Scant information about outgroups (due to illiteracy, state-controlled media, salience of perception, etc.) makes it extremely difficult for people to form independent information about others. Peter Smith and Michael Harris Bond believed that shutting out information about others leads to the redeployment of consciousness, "especially in cross-cultural encounters, where surprises are likely to abound."[27] William Gudykunst provided a plausible explanation for avoidance of interaction in crosscultural settings. He argued that this type of interaction requires the acquisition of new information about outgroups which may necessitate amending already existing notions

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[22] Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200* (London: SPCK, 1972), 1.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 10.

[25] Bernd Simon, "Self and Group in Modern Society: Ten Theses on the Individual Self and the Collective Self," in Russell Spears et al., eds., *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life* (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1997), 324.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Peter B. Smith and Michael Harris Bond, *Social Psychology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994), 169.

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about them. New situations, almost invariably cause anxiety and lack of security.[28] Reduction of anxiety impels a group, whose members lack in individualism, to formulate intentions, or a defense mechanism, which Gudykunst called instructions for behavior with outgroups in situations requiring the acquisition of new information.[29]

The behavioral instructions employ, sometimes even manipulate, the content of existing attitudinal components, i.e., the cognitive, the affective, and the conative.[30] Zandn asserted that persons (and groups) threatened by new, potentially destabilizing situations meticulously organize their tripartite attitudes to avid conflict.[31] The formation and maintenance of attitudes generate what Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell called the political self.[32] It contains fleeting views (on current affairs, policies, etc.) and basic, unalterable attitudes (on nationalism, ideology,etc..).[33] Wendell Jeffrey and Salvatore Maddi added that basic attitudes, which are resistant to change, are learned early in life from "... parents and credible sources of information."[34]

Basic Arab Attitudes

It is unfair to group Arab publics' attitudes in one monolithic category. That would be both wrong and prejudicial. Arabs, as one might soundly predict, are not of one persuasion and go through dissimilar socialization processes not only from one country to another, but from one region to another in the same country. There are, nevertheless, some basic attitudes that, although may not characterize all Arabs, seem to influence the attitudes of, at least, a

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[28] William B. Gudykunst, "Toward a Theory of Effective Interpersonal and Intergroup Communication: An Anxiety/Uncertainty (AUM) Perspective," in Richard L. Wiseman and Jolene Koester, *Intercultural Communication Competence* (Newbury Park, C.A.: Sage, 1993), 38-9.

[29] Ibid., 41.

[30] Cognitive relates to object perception, affective consists of feelings, and conative represents the behavioral aspect of an attitude.

[31] Zanden, *Social Psychology*, 182.

[32] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (Glenview, I.L.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988), 40.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Wendell E. Jeffrey and Salvatore R. Maddi, *Understanding Social Psychology* (Homewood, I.L.: The Dorsey Press, 1983), 45.

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considerable proportion of Arabs. This section only considers attitudes that may influence the way Arabs view peace with Israel. In connection with this, Sandra MacKey noted that "honor is the driving force of the Arab psyche."[35] Attainment of honor does not derive from one's behavior, rather from approval by others. Personal honor bestows self-respect without which an Arab lives in shame, an intolerable situation that calls on shamed Arabs to avenge lost honor.[36] Poorly differentiated Arab societies, thanks to the persistence of economic undervelopment, meant that the need for equality continues to predominate Arab thinking. Some Arabs confide in informal discussion that the main reason they continue to oppose peace with Israel emanates from unequal relations between victorious Israel and defeated Arabs. Inequality reduces honor prompting factiousness and proneness to fighting, which Raphael Patai regarded as a most explicit Arab manifestation.[37]

In a brilliant study, Raymond Cohen alluded to certain Arab attitudes that contributed to stalling the peace talks between Israel and Syria. He noticed that the Syrian and Israeli negotiating teams exhibited "... profound cross-cultural differences ... [and communicated] with different codes."[38] Cohen described the Syrian culture – it shares many qualities with the Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian cultures – in the following words:

> The extended family – the clan – provides them with a primary focus of affiliation... Group values are preeminent, casting the individual in a subordinate, even vulnerable, role. Leadership is paternalistic, society hierarchically organized. Conformism and obedience, not individualism, are central virtues.... In a collectivist society, the individual is vitally concerned with how he will appear in the eyes of others.... Directness and contradiction are much disliked as threatening communal harmony.... Acute and justified alertness to hidden meanings breeds mistrust of stated intentions and a proclivity

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[35] Sandra MacKey, *Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs* (New York: Dutton, 1992), 26.

[36] Ibid., 26-7.

[37] Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, revised edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), 209.

[38] Raymond Cohen, "Negotiations Across the Golan Heights: Culture Gets in the Way," *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1994, 45.

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for conspiracy theories.[39]

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev contended that an important breakthrough has occurred in the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically overcoming the emotional dimension of the conflict.[40]

Arab Poets as Sustainers of Conflict

Arab countries suffer from meager – in certain cases almost nonexistent – civil societies. This weakness mainly derives from the ruling elites' suppression of oppositional political action, and the prevalence of parochial identifications precipitated by unacceptably slow social change. The absence of real interest groups and independent mass media networks have mightily limited Arab populations' access to information. A legacy of defeat, official overbearing, high illiteracy rates, and deep-seated emotionalism all fostered reliance on traditional – mostly vocal – forms of communication, especially poetry. Arab poets used language, interacted with it and easily disseminated it in poetry responsive societies, much to keep alive the conflict with Israel. Political poetry constitutes a very important component of modern Arab poetry. The fame of an Arab poet, as well as his/her recognition rests on leaving a mark on a relevant Pan-Arab political issue. Immediately following the establishment of the state of Israel, 'Umar Abu Risha, a Syrian poet of Lebanese origin, wrote an influential poem entitled *Ba'd al-Nakba* (in the aftermath of the Catastrophe). The following passage sheds light on Arab mood then:

> O beloved Homeland! Have you been panged by a bloody strangulation?
> It is the blow that has been delivered to my pride that prevents my wounds from healing

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[39] Ibid., 45-6.

[40] Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, "The Emotional Aspects of the Path to Peace," in Joseph Ginat and Onn Winckler, eds., *The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle: Smoothing the Path to Peace* (Brighton, Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 99.

Most Arabs are poetic and reactive people. Arab poetry often sacrifices content and meaning for expressive and rhythmic verses. Hence Arab poetry, especially political poetry, discards accurate description for maximum impact on listeners even if it entails misinformation, as it often does.

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By what right does Israel's banner wave over the Church of Nativity and the Dome of the Rock?
How could you turn a blind eye to disgrace, nor defend yourself in the face of accusations?
Haven't you always been one to defend your integrity to the death?[41]

Disgrace, activated by injured Arab pride, seemed to bother Abu Risha most. His urging of Arabs to avenge the loss of Palestine appeared more motivated by the desire to restore face than reinstating the Palestinians. The issue of doing Arabs injustice, and the need to restore balance and self-respect (usually manifested in tribal terminology), invites their anger. Poet Mahmud Darwish, formerly an Arab-Israeli citizen, graphically described his inner feelings in the following verses from *Bitaqat Hawiyya* (identity card):

I am not a hater, nor am I a looter
But I will devour those who do me wrong
Do not underestimate my hunger and my anger![42]

Darwish's verses entitle the critical reader to draw the conclusion that injustice legitimates raw retaliation and sanctions irrational behavior and the triumph of atavistic identifications. The picture becomes clearer if one realizes that emotion, not realistic evaluation of the situation, contributes to the input of Arab poetry in shaping Arab views on conflict with the Jewish state. In a contribution by Bshara 'Abd Allah al-Khury, a prominent Lebanese poet, entitled Sada al-Qubulat (echo of kisses), reference to nostalgia and unquenchable emotions, which punctuate the text, betray a tendency for conflict perpetuation supplied by an inundation of emotionalism., as the following verses suggest:

Palestine! Ye temple of memories
Palestine! Ye dream of prophets....

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[41] 'Umar Abu Risha, "Ba'd al-Nakba," in Salim al-Bustani, ed., *Al-Adab al-'Arabi* (Beirut: Al-Markaz al-Tarbawi li al-Buhuth wa al-Inma', 1st Secondary Year, 1998), 161.

[42] Mahmud Darwish, *Diwan Mahmud Darwish*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-'Awda, 1977), 127.

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I am all unquenchable emotions for you....[43]

Nizar Qabbani, the Syrian poet who won unrivaled acclaim throughout the Arab World for his poems on love and women, received tremendous respect for his contributions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a piece emphasizing the Arab character of Jerusalem, Qabbani spoke about blossoming orange trees and rejoicing wheat plants, implying the imminence of its recapture by Arab armies.

Ye Jerusalem.. my city
Ye Jerusalem.. my sweetheart
Tomorrow, the orange trees shall blossom
And the green wheat plants shall rejoice
And playing children return
And fathers and sons reunite.[44]

In a much more bellicose tone, Qabbani paid tribute to Palestinian movements' attacks against Israel in piece entitled Manshurat Fida'iyya 'ala Judran Isra'il (guerrilla leaflets on Israeli walls). He advised the Israelis to abandon Palestine, because their fight against the Arabs is a losing business. He stressed the importance of Arab hate and wrath in sealing the fate of the Jewish state. He warned them against arrogance heightened by Israel's victory in the Six day War of June 1967, arguing that defeating Arab armies has not waned Arab publics' hate for the existence of Israel, nor their determination to uproot it. Qabbani did not limit his verses to expounding wishes for destroying Israel; seemingly confident that the elimination of the Hebrew state conforms with the path of history, he resorted to slander to discredit the very existence of Israel. The following verses vividly illustrate the thoughts of Qabbani:

You shall not flee from my wrath....
There is a rifle in every household
From the banks of the Nile to the Euphrates....

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[43] Bshara 'Abd Allah al-Khury, *Shi'r al-Akhtal al-Saghir* (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1972), 299.

[44] Nizar Qabbani, *Al-A'mal al-Siyasiyya al-Kamila*, vol. 3 (Beirut: Manshurat Nizar Qabbani, 1983), 159-64.

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O ye Children of Israel,
Don't be so arrogant
The clock may stop
but it will restart....
You have conquered the armies...
but you haven't conquered the feelings
You have cut off the trees,
but the roots have remained
What's between us doesn't end in a year, or five, or ten or a millennium
The battles of liberation shall last very long....
You are besieged by grudge and hate
Your peace is in shatters
Your home is surrounded, like a whore house
We shall march toward you in order to correct the path of history.[45]

In a poem, *Muhakamat Nazi* (trial of a Nazi), ridiculing the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Rashid Salim al-Khury, called upon all nations to put an end to the Jewish political entity. Describing Jews in psychopathic terms he regarded them as the enemy of all humanity, thus vindicating their eviction from the Holy Land:

There shall be no peace till the earth rids itself of the menacing nuisance
Its livelihood is fueled by an unsatiable desire for malice.[46]

Choosing the Survey Sample

Addressing the questions raised in this study required the administration of an empirically testable instrument. For this purpose, the author obtained a quota sample of 1600 male and female respondents, divided equally among Lebanese, Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians. The sample accounted for the social and economic characteristics of the societies from which the respondents were drawn. All respondents were Muslims, and in the case of Lebanon

[45] Ibid., 165-98.

[46] Rashid Salim al-Khury, *Diwan al-Qarawi* (Sao Paulo: Matba'at Safadi al-Tijariyya, n.d.), 459.

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they were equally divided between Sunnis and Shi'is. Palestinian respondents came from the areas of the Palestinian Authority (50%), Syria and Lebanon (25% each). Data generation took place during February and March in 1999.The questionnaires were administered by ten trained interviewers with previous field experience. The main researcher adhered to standard instrument quality procedures such as pretesting (30 cases), reliability measures (consistency and congruence with reality), and validity measures (criterion and construct). Careful instrument construction drew on the author's previous research on the topic and tremendously benefited from the relevant literature on survey research. The author maintained close contact with the field workers during the entire period of data collection and personally supervised the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation and presentation.

A Note on Data Collection and Presentation of Findings

In order to achieve the objectives of this ambitious study, the researcher intends to develop an original instrument. In addition to the conventional questions which appeared in the previous WINEP study, he seeks to include in the questionnaire certain introductory statements before a series of related questions are asked. The aim here is to acquaint the respondents with the issue under consideration before obtaining their answers, which may, in such case, be based on stereotyping or lack of information. For example, prior to asking respondents to evaluate their perceptions of Israelis, it might be useful to make a few statements about Jewish historical experience in Eastern and Central Europe. We want to see if better understanding may contribute to empathy. If we ask direct questions without background information, we will probably obtain negative answers. The idea here is not to manipulate the respondents to get them to provide favorable responses (this would be an obvious violation of the empirical method), but to increase their cognitive knowledge before they give their affective and evaluative responses. Although we are interested in reporting attitudes as they are, we are also concerned about probing for the possibility of attitudinal change.

Since the data includes Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians, the presentation of findings intends to acknowledge significant national differences among the respondents whenever they are encountered. In the absence of statistically significant national

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differences, the emphasis will shift to the identification of other independent variables that may associate or correlate with the respondents' attitudes on peace with Israel.

General Sample Characteristics

A good inferential sample must include as many population strata as possible. Equally important, the sample must focus on those strata that are more likely to shape public opinion than others. Sociologists and social psychologists may, quite understandably, endlessly debate the dynamics of social interaction, especially in highly stratified Western societies. Transitional Arab populations lack the complex social stratification that characterizes modern Western societies. Even though social strata in the West tend to wield disproportionate power and influence, socioeconomic and political interactions usually occur in integrated societies, in sharp contrast with dichotomization that pervade the fabric of Arab societies. The author took note of the essential characteristics of Arab populations included in this study, and incorporated them in the selection of respondents to the extent they seemed to shape aggregate attitudes.

The selection of respondents by age (table 1) recognized the youthfulness of Arab populations, marked by high birth rates and and moderate life expectancies. This distribution is useful since it allows the testing of hypotheses that link religious militancy and anti-Israeli terror to young age.

Table 1: Age Groups (N=1600)

	%
Between 18 yrs and 27 yrs	30.4
Between 28 yrs and 37 yrs	19.4
Between 38 yrs and 47 yrs	18.7
Between 48 yrs and 57 yrs	18.0
58 yrs and older	13.6
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Public opinion polls in the West do not discriminate against women. The distribution of respondents in this study by gender shows that women represent only one-third of the sample (table 2).

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Considering that Arab societies are male dominant, the proportion of women achieved in this study results from great effort to ensure a modicum of representativeness by gender.[47]

Table 2: Gender (N=1600)

	%
Male	63.0
Female	37.0
Total	100

The respondents were divided equally among Lebanese, Syrians, Jordanians, and Palestinians, despite the difference in the size of the populations of these societies (table 3). This study did not overlook the possible intersocietal impact of certain independent variables such as religiosity and socioeconomic status on determining views on peace with the state of Israel. Nevertheless, assumptions about the likelihood of existence of attitudinal differences in these four societies (due to differing predispositions toward peace by the ruling elites and varying degrees of societal openness) deemed it more appropriate to assign equal sub-samples.

Table 3: Nationality (N=1600)

	%
Lebanese	25.0
Syrian	25.0
Jordanian	25.0
Palestinian	25.0
Total	100

Table 4 describes the distribution of respondents by sect which shows an overwhelming Sunni Muslim majority. The selection of respondents requires an explanation. Even though Sunnis do not

[47] With the probable exception of Lebanon, women are not readily accessible for interviewing in conservative and mostly gender segregated Arab societies.

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represent a decisive majority in Syria (barely over 50% of the population are Arab Sunnis) and Lebanon (a definite numerical minority), it is generally understood that the pace and rhythm of Arab attitudes on conflict with Israel are determined by Sunnis. This does not imply that historical religious minorities such as Druze and Christians have not developed attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. To the contrary, Christians have led the most radical Palestinian groups; similarly Lebanese and Syrian Druze have adopted strong ant-Israeli stands, at least in public. Put in simple words, the Arabs decision to determine the fate of their conflict with the Jewish state rests in Sunni hands.[48]

Table 4: Sect (N=1600)

	%
Sunni	87.5
Shi'i	12.5
Total	100

Place of residence (table 5) is an interesting independent variable due to the urban-rural dichotomy that usually punctuates social interactions and political attitudes in the Arab countries included in the present study. In these countries, Islamic movements tend to have their bases of support in urban centers, whereas nationalist and leftist groups have attracted the majority of their rank and file from rural and semi-urban areas.[49] In selecting the respondents, the field workers made every effort to ensure balanced representation in observance of the urban-rural dichotomy that prevails in the Levant.

[48] In Lebanon, where the country's major sects compete for power and position in political system's limited opportunities for participation, the head of the Lebanese delegation in negotiations with the Israelis has always been a Sunni Muslim. The working motto has been that whatever is acceptable to the Sunnis on this sensitive issue, is acceptable to all other Lebanese sects.

[49] This sharply contrast the situation in Egypt, where the strengths of radical Islamic movements depended on heavy recruitment from rural Upper Egypt.

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Table 5: Place of Residence (N=1600)

	%
Urban	57.8
Semi-Urban	13.4
Rural	28.8
Total	100

Socioeconomic status is a central independent variable in this study. Table 6 presents a summary scale of three items pertaining to education, occupation and income (see appendix "A" for the text and distribution of the items, as well as the results of the validity procedure). The representation of the respondents according to social and economic variables did correspond to the actual distribution of the of the populations under study. The author deemed the distribution appearing in table 6 as crucial to better explore the impact of socioeconomic variables on peace-related issues.

Table 6: SES Scale (N=1600)

	%
High	26.5
Medium	39.8
Low	33.8
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The religiosity scale appearing in table 7 summarizes two items on religiosity (self-evaluation of religious devoutness, and (2) frequency of performing regular religious obligations (see appendix "B" for the text and distribution of the items, as well as the results of the validity procedure). The percentages of responses for religiosity (table 7) and intense religiosity (table 8) did not result from quota allocation, unlike other background variables. If anything, they reflect a high level of religiosity, which is not surprising.

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Table 7: Religiosity Scale (N=1600)

	%
High	37.4
Medium	41.1
Low	21.5
Total	100

The intense religiosity scale refers to those devout Muslims who place faith at the center of their life. Put differently, they do not regard religion as a private matter but choose, among other things, to display it in public. Intensely religious Muslims usually plead for recognition of the political dimension of Islam. The intense religiosity scale which appears in table 8 summarizes three items on (1) the influence of religious belief on lifestyle, (2) the contribution of religious belief to shaping of political views, and (3) the display of religious belief (see appendix "B" for the text and distribution of the items, as well as the results of the validity procedure).

Table 8: Intense Religiosity Scale (N=1600)

	%
High	15.4
Medium	20.0
Low	64.7
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

General Findings

A. Identity Orientation and Globalization

Political identity brings people together and separates them from others. Its universalism, typically characteristic of Western nation-states, has strengthened national politics and facilitated the emergence of strong civil societies. Recent decades, more so last few year, have shown that highly nationalistic societies are far more

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capable of interstate cooperation than weak nationalistic societies.[50] Table 9 shows the strength of Islam as a definer of political identity and the weakness of territorial nationalism which competes with regional identifications, a familiar occurrence in most underdeveloped countries. Even though more than one-fourth of the respondents choose Arab nationalism as the source of their political identity it is most unlikely that they comply with its prerequisites (see note number 52).

Table 9: Your political identity is best expressed in terms of (N=1593):

	%
Regionalism	13.1
Territorial nationalism	13.4
Arab nationalism	26.1
Islam	42.9
Mediterraneanism	00.9
Unsure	03.6
Total	100

Expectably, almost four-fifth of the respondents choose an Arab economic arrangement as opposed to Middle Eastern cooperation (a bare 12%). These results, which appear in table 10, indicate unwillingness to cooperate with Israel and Turkey. There is, however, a distance between attitude and behavior. Arab publics' strong expression of Pan-Arab feelings in the 1950s and 1960s did not lead to the success of Arab nationalism. In fact, declined as sharply as it rose. Arab officials endorsed Several inter-Arab economic plans over the past four decades, none of which produced worthwhile results. To date, the volume of inter-Arab trade represents only five percent of the total trade of all Arab countries. Arab countries must presently deal, nevertheless, with a clearly more complex regional and international environment than what they encountered in past years. Arab leaders, such as President Husni Mubarak and President Hafiz

[50] People in nationalistic societies must possess the following four prerequisites: group distinction, patriotism, vision, and political action. The last two components are absent in Arab societies.

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al-Asad, have for some time been trying to increase the rate of inter-Arab cooperation, although it does not seem that they have been successful in scoring measurable results.

Table 10: People everywhere talk nowadays about the importance of joining regional economic blocs.In connection with this, do you prefer to see your country becoming part of an (N=1600):

	%
Arab economic arrangement	79.5
A Middle Eastern arrangement	12.0
Any arrangement of benefit to us	01.3
No arrangement of any type	02.5
Unsure	04.6
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

An overwhelming majority of the respondents feel Arabs stand to lose from involvement in globalization. Insecurity, a sense of relative incompetence, lack of tradition of broad cooperation with outsiders appear to have convinced most respondents to develop negative perceptions about the merits of globalization (see table 11 for the text and distribution of responses).

Table 11: Do you believe that Arabs will make significant gains from involving themselves in the globalization process? (N=1597)

	%
Arabs will make significant gains	18.7
Arabs will endure significant losses	78.1
Unsure	03.3
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Probing for reasons behind this unusually strong aversion to globalization produced interesting results (table 12). Major concerns relate to fears of perpetuating Arab economic dependency, further erosion of Arab identity, and enhancement of Israel's military and

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economic preponderance in the region. One tiny segment of the respondents say globalization will favorably reflect on prospects for Arab democracy, and another associate it with technological gains.

Table 12: Justify your answer to the question on benefiting from globalization? (N=1545)

	%
Globalization will enhance Arab democracy	07.0
Globalization will benefit Arabs technologically	09.8
Globalization will make Arab economies more competitive	02.5
Globalization will increase Arab economic dependency on advanced societies	28.2
Globalization will destroy Arab identity	26.2
Globalization will legitimize Israel's preponderance in the region	26.3
Total	100

The issue of globalization is the subject of intense debate in the Arab World. It is often viewed by many Arabs as a symbol of U.S. increasing power in world affairs and by deduction, an indicator of Israel's unrivaled supremacy in the Middle East. Thoughtful Arab scholars appear to have come to grips with the requirements of globalization. 'Abd al-Mun'im Sa'id saw it in terms of technological and economic resources: "Power and authority in the new age of globalization are not determined by military power alone, but by technological and and economic capacity as well."[51]
He correctly recognized the concerns of globalization as follows: "The issues of the new global system emphasize economic and social functions such as unemployment, inflation, currency rates, financial markets, trade barriers, investment, etc."[52]

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[51] 'Abd al-Mun'im sa'id, "Ma Ba'd al-Harb al-Barida: Al-Nizam al-Dawli Bain al-Fawda wa al-Istiqrar," in Mustafa al-Hamarina, ed., *Al-'Arab fi al-Istratijiyyat al-'Alamiyya* (Amman: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya, 1994), 36.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East* (Shaftesbury, Great Britain: Element, 1993), 62.
[52] Ibid., 36.

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Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres proposed the creation of a Middle Eastern order for economic and security cooperation. He sought to market his ideas with unwarranted confidence, as though he had never experienced the daunting intricacies of Middle Eastern politics : "Our ultimate goal is the creation of a regional community of nations, with a common market and elected centralized bodies, modeled on the European community."[53] His ideas originated from the fact that recent years have been witnessing an animated interstate cooperation. This emanated from qualitative factors (scientific progress, rapid means of communication interaction, etc.), which have greatly lessened the traditional significance of quantitative factors (military power, land size, natural resources, etc.). Peres expected the new forceful trend to "foster... a peaceful environment and create... wealth and goodwill"[54] for the countries of the Middle East.

Bilal al-Hasan dismissed the Perez plan outright. In a statement reminiscent of the political discourse that prevailed in the Arab World in the pre-1967 Six Day War, he rejected any form of cooperation with the Jewish state demanding the reactivation of the Palestine question: "What is this strange talk that we hear from Mr. Shimon Peres? He says we have three common issues for cooperation: development, desertification and fundamentalism. We know of one issue between us, the Palestinian issue..."[55] Thinking conspiratorially, Muhammad 'Atwi expressed confidence that Israel's economic project for the Middle East seeks to alter the economic structure of Arab countries by tying them, on the basis of unequal relationships, to its far more advanced economy. He emphasized that Israel's "... strategic objective is to achieve political peace under the guise of economic welfare."

B. Agents of Attitude Formation Toward Israel

The majority of people in underdeveloped countries experience difficulty in forming opinions on universalistic issues. Instead, they

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Bilal al-Hasan, *Al-Salam al-Ajwaf* (Damascus: Al-Ahali li al-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 1994), 42.

[55] Muhammad 'Atwi, *Al-Salam al-Da'i': Netanyahu Yahriq Washington* (Beirut: Dar al-Harf al-'Arabi, 1998), 73.

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preoccupy themselves with narrow concerns reflecting societal divisions and narrow identification trends. Arab countries, all of which appear quagmired in the world of underdevelopment, do not deviate from this pattern. Tribalism, regionalism, sect and family origins still define the fiber of society in Arab lands. There, two issues seem to deviate from the existing mechanism of attitude formation as far as their ability to attract broad support despite otherwise fragmented societies, i.e., attitudes on the role of Islam in society and perceptions toward Israel. Table 13 sheds light on the sources of attitude formation on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The same sources of socialization that form opinion on other matters, and in the process divide society, seem to operate with regard to Israel. The Arab social environment, in its emphasis on collectivity, does not view with favor community members whose independent thinking leads them to different interpretations. Here, the responses reflect the impact of society (community, family, leaders) on forming opinions in Arab countries.

Table 13: Which of the following most determines your views on the Arab-Israeli conflict? (N=1600)

	%
My own evaluation of the situation	13.7
My relatives	26.7
My peers	12.8
The views of the community	25.6
The statements of Arab leaders	13.2
Israeli behavior	08.0
Total	100

Individuals evaluating a situation on their own usually obtain information from different sources, which increases the likelihood of developing balanced and moderate views on the issue under consideration. Norman John Powell seems to agree with this assessment. He asserted that people receiving their information on controversial topics from different sources, preferably independent,

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tend to form conciliatory policy choices.[56] Crosstabulation shows an exceptionally strong association between source of attitude formation and respondents' preferred kind of cooperation with Israelis (see table 14 for the text and distribution of responses). Among the fraction of respondents who want to cooperate with Israelis (less than 30% of sample), all those who say they prefer to independently evaluate the situation before judging it said they prefer close cooperation with Israelis. Other forms of attitude formation failed to sway a single respondent to consider close cooperation.

Table 14: Association between Agents of Attitude Formation on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Preferred Kind of Relations with Israelis (N=453)

Agents Determining Views on the Conflict	Preferred Kind of Cooperation with Israelis			
	Close	Regular	Little	None
	n=87	n=111	129	126
	%	%	%	%
My own evaluation of the situation	100.0	87.4	09.3	--
My relatives	--	09.9	12.4	17.5
My peers	--	02.7	34.9	30.2
The views of the community	--	--	24.0	08.7
Statements of Arab leaders	--	--	19.4	39.7
Israeli behavior	--	--	--	04.0
Total	100	100	100.1*	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 15 reveals the preeminence of family socialization and school curricula in influencing the attitudes of respondents on the conflict between Arabs and Israel. Family socialization wields a much stronger influence than school experience, which lasts only for a number of years. Two-thirds received no college education, indicating a shorter period of exposure to formal education.

[56] Norman John Powell, *Anatomy of Public Opinion* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1953), 423.

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Table 15: From the list that follows, choose and rank order the two most important sources of information on the Arab-Israeli conflict that you feel have shaped your views on it:

	(N=1600) %	(N=1507) %	
Weighted Scores**			
Family socialization	65.2	20.6	76
School curricula	15.4	53.7	41
Local media	13.1	16.0	21
International media	06.4	09.6	11
Total	100.1*	99.9*	

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

**The weighted scores are determined by combining the values of the first and second choices, with first choices assigned twice as much weight as second choices.

The present era of emerging globalization, with its emphasis on interstate interaction and redefinition of lingering conflicts, requires processing new sources of information to countervail traditional, often conflictive, sources of information. Table 16 presents distressing findings since it displays the strength of the sources of attitude formation that have kept the Arab-Jewish conflict alive for a century. More alarming are the answers of respondents (one-fifth of the sample size) who said that nothing will change their mind on perceptions related to the conflict with Israel. When this result is compared with independent-minded respondents (only 10%), the scope of entrenched ideas and stereotypes becomes disturbingly evident.

Table 16: If you were to modify your views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which of the following is likely to play the most crucial role? (N=1595)

	%
My own evaluation of the situation	10.1
My relatives	26.2
My peers	13.9
The views of the community	19.4
The statements of Arab leaders	05.7
Israeli behavior	02.5
Nothing will change my mind	19.4

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Unsure	02.8
Total	100

A social scientist would find it difficult to imagine that adamant views occur by themselves, without relationship to independent variables. The author hypothesized that these extreme responses relate to intense religiosity. Crosstabulation results, which appear in table 17, confirm this hypothesis. All respondents who said nothing will change their minds with regard to Israelis reported intense observance of Islamic tenets. The results point to the possibility of turbulent relationships between intense religiosity in Islam, at least as manifested by the respondents, and attitudes on various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Table 17: Association between Intense Religiosity and Modification of Views on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (N=1595)

Agents of Views Modification Scale	Intense Religiosity		
	High n=246 %	Medium n=316 %	Low n=1033 %
My own evaluation of the situation	02.4	13.6	10.8
My relatives	--	07.3	38.2
My peers	--	07.9	19.0
The views of the community	--	25.9	22.1
Statements of Arab leaders	--	04.1	07.6
Israeli behavior	--	10.1	00.8
Nothing will change my mind	97.6	19.0	00.9
Unsure	--	12.0	00.7
Total	100	99.9*	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

C. Attitudes Toward National Government

Arab publics usually manifest negative tendencies toward their national governments, often branding them as insensitive to public needs. Arab governments do not tolerate open dissent, usually

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repressing even mild expressions of disaffection. In a question on assessment of the performance of their government (table 18), the overwhelming majority of respondents say they are unhappy about it.

Table 18: Are you happy with the overall performance of your government? (N=1600)

	%
Very happy	06.5
Happy	07.3
Unhappy	38.6
Very unhappy	45.1
Unsure	02.5
Total	100

Nearly 90% of the respondents do not feel the their ruling elites work for the best interest of the people. This brings to the front the question of political legitimacy in Arab countries. Arab publics generally view the ruling elites as illegitimate; even in traditional Arab states, which continue to rely on tribal consent, political legitimacy seems to be rapidly declining as the populations quickly absorb new ideas in this age of information influx.

Table 19: Essentially, the ruling elite in my country work for the best interest of the people. (N=1592)

	%
Strongly agree	04.6
Agree	05.2
Disagree	26.4
Strongly disagree	62.4
Unsure	01.4
Total	100

Bureaucratic corruption and elites' abuse of power in the Arab World are thoroughly documented and need no additional elaboration. Abuse of power is so institutionalized in this part of the world that even the recently established PA seems to conform to the general pattern of governance that prevails in Arab countries. Fahmi

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Huwaydi assessed the accomplishments of the PA five years after signing Oslo agreements. He reported prevalent corruption, increasing poverty, intolerable repression, severe bureaucratic overstaffing, unprecedented preying on public funds, systematic violations of basic human rights by the PA's so-called preventive security forces and intelligence units.[57] Arab publics' perceptions of their governments is negative to the point where even less than 7% of the respondents accept the maintenance the existing Arab political systems in their present forms. Almost one-fourth of the respondents demand use of force to overthrow Arab ruling elites, an unusually high percentage of respondents and a sure sign of simmering societal turmoil.

Table 20: With regard to promoting developmental change, my country's political system (N=1600):

	%
Should be maintained in its present form	06.8
Should be reformed peacefully	68.7
Should be overthrown by force	23.3
Unsure	01.3
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Gregory Mahler suggested the presence of a positive relationship between Arabs' favorable evaluation of the performance of their governments and holding favorable views on peace with Israel.[58] Sample results (see table 21) reveal a relationship between preference for domestic violence and use of military force against the state of Israel in the presence of a third variable, the one on intense religiosity.

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[57] *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, September 5, 1998.

[58] M. Zuhair Diab, "The Prospects for Peace between Israel and Syria: A Syrian View," in Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace* (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 70.

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Table 21: Relationship between Perceived Developmental Change in the Respondents' Countries, Attitude on the Use of Force against Israel and Intense Religiosity

Degree of Religiosity N=1580)	Perception of domestic change (N=429)						
	Overthrow n=372 %	Reform n=1099 %	Maintain n=109 %	SA n=261 %	A n=107 %	D n=19 %	SD n=42 %
High	64.8	00.5	--	88.6	14.0	--	--
Medium	32.0	16.6	13.8	10.3	68.2	10.5	19.0
Low	03.2	83.0	86.2	01.1	17.8	89.5	81.0
Total	100	100.1*	100	100	100	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Crosstabulation findings reveal that intensely religious respondents who tend to advocate overthrowing Arab regimes by force also endorse its use against the Jewish state. Even though more intensely religious respondents choose violence against Israel than their government, it remains that the majority of them view both as legitimate targets for fundamentalist wrath.

IV. The Conflict to the Minds of Respondents

Palestinians are not popular in the Arab World, but the Palestinian question is popular. Arabs may mistreat Palestinians, denying them basic human rights and deny them access to their countries, still, the Arab-Israeli conflict goes on. Far more Palestinians have been killed by Arabs than Israelis, yet Palestine resides in Arab hearts. Heavy anti-Israeli political socialization and intertwinement between Pan-Arabism and Islam have reserved a special place for the Palestinian issue in Arab collective consciousness. The sample included a question that required the respondents to indicate the scope of concern about the Palestinian question. One would have expected the respondents to see it as an essentially Palestinian matter, especially since the PA has engaged in direct negotiations with the Israelis and concluded agreements with them. Quite to the contrary, the vast majority of respondents still see

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the issue of interest to the Arab and Islamic Worlds (see table 22).

Table 22: The Palestinian question essentially concerns (N=1600):

	%
The Islamic World	40.5
The Arab World	45.1
Arab countries bordering Israel	07.4
The Palestinians	05.1
Unsure	01.9
Total	100

As one can tell from Table 23 there is a very strong association between intense religiosity and perception of the scope of concern about the Palestinian question. Even respondents not so intense in their religiosity see Palestine as an Islamic issue. The majority of other respondents (either performing basic religious chores, or simply irreligious) see the Palestinian question as an Arab issue.

Table 23: Association between Intense Religiosity and Scope of Concern about the Palestinian Question (N=1600)

Scope of Concern	Intense Religiosity Scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=246	n=319	n=1035
	%	%	%
The Islamic World	98.0	92.8	10.7
The Arab World	02.0	03.8	68.1
Arab countries bordering Israel	--	03.4	10.3
The Palestinians	--	--	07.8
Unsure	--	--	03.0
Total	100	100	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The respondents' answers do suggest that they see religion as an important source behind the Arab-Israeli conflict (table 24). They see it as an ideological intrusion (Zionism) and imperialism (Western advances in the Arab East since the early twentieth century). Arabs

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indefatigably argue that were it not for the West (Britain since 1917, and the U.S. since 1942) the idea of a Jewish state would not have come true. The Zionist threat has not ended with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, but continues – thus goes the argument – into the present and threatens Arab future.

Table 24: The roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict mainly relate to (N=1589):

	%
Religion	06.4
Ideology	32.1
Imperialism	60.5
Unsure	01.0
Total	100

Jawad al-Hamad warned Arabs and Muslims against the dangers of Israeli expansionism, considering it their duty to stop Israel. He spoke in strong terms about "... Zionist extremism, namely growing Zionist fundamentalism."[59] He warned against what he called "expansionist and belligerent Zionist doctrine."[60] Hani al-Hasan proposed that religious Zionism seeks to perpetuate the theory that non-Arabs should rule Arabs. Its long-term objective endeavors to ensure the continuation of Israeli military preponderance since Israel simply aspires to reap the fruits of peace without paying any price to the Palestinians, except to live in the shadow of Israel.[61]

The respondents appear divided on the future of Israel between its expansion and eventual demise, with a slight majority anticipating the second possibility (see table 25). Some writers argue that Israel wants peace for expansionist purposes.

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[59] Jawad al-Hamad, *Mustaqbal al-Salam fi al-Sharq al-Awsat* (Annandale, V.A.: Al-Mu'assasa al-Muttahida li al-Dirasat wa al-Buhuth, 1994), 156.

[60] Ibid.

[61] *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 22, 1998.

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Table 25: In the future, Israel will (N=1600):

	%
Survive in its present form	13.4
Expand at the expense of Arabs	30.7
Eventually disappear as a sovereign state	53.9
Unsure	02.1
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

In view of this, Munir al-Humsh claimed that Israel aspires to realize through peace what it could not win in wars with Arabs. Arab populations, he stressed, condemn this peace because it runs counter to their aspirations and negates historical and geographical facts, therefore it has no future.[62]

He summed up his detailed account about the impossibility of Arab-Israeli peace by exhorting Arabs to resist peace efforts and to work diligently in order to bring to fruition what he called the Pan-Arab civilizational program, as the only realistic hope to contain the expansionist ideas of Zionist leaders.[63]

Religiosity is associated very strongly with perceptions on the future of Israel. Almost all highly religious respondents express confidence about the eventual disappearance of the state of Israel. Least religious respondents seem mostly unconvinced that Israel will disappear (see table 26 for the text and distribution of the responses). The distribution of responses is particularly significant and shows polarization in Arab societies with regard to the future of conflict. Belief that Israel will not survive encourages believers to proceed with the conflict until it reaches its expected outcome. The responses conform with the prevailing trend among Arabs these days, where religious groups, notably fundamentalist, carry the banner of confrontation with Israel.

[62] Munir al-Humsh, *Al-Salam al-Mudan* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1997), 9-20.
[63] Ibid., 466.

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Table 26: Association between Religiosity and the Future of Israel (N=1600)

The Future Status of Israel	Religiosity Scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=598	n=658	n=344
	%	%	%
Survive in its present form	00.3	10.8	41.0
Expand at the expense of Arabs	01.2	55.6	34.3
Eventually disappear as a sovereign state	98.3	31.8	18.9
Unsure	00.2	01.8	05.8
Total	100	100	100

Less than one-fifth of the respondents disclose faith in the Israelis' desire to live in peace with their Arab neighbors. The majority of interviewees manifest either worry about Hebrews' expansionism or antipathy for their perceived racism (see table 27). What is disturbing is not whether the Israelis truly aspire after peace with Arabs or not, but rather the readiness of a great majority of respondents to arrive at this conclusion without awareness of the political debate that rages in Israel on this subject.

Table 27: In your opinion, the majority of the people of Israel display (N=1596):

	%
An earnest desire to live in peace with their Arab neighbors	18.9
Expansionist tendencies toward Arabs	51.1
Racist attitudes toward Arabs	22.4
Unsure	07.6
Total	100

Cross tabulation reveals strong association between socioeconomic status (SES) and projection of Israeli attitudes toward Arabs. The majority of respondents scoring high on SES express

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confidence in Israelis' willingness to live in peace with Arabs (table 28). This percentage drops sharply with medium SES and virtually disappears with low SES. These results introduce SES as a significant variable in moderating Arab views toward Israelis, and in checking radical Islam.

Table 28: Association between Socioeconomic Status (SES) and Projection of Israeli Attitudes toward Arabs (N=1596)

Projection of Israeli Attitudes	SES Scale		
	High n=424 %	Med. n=634 %	Low n=538 %
Israelis display earnest desire to live in peace	56.4	09.5	00.4
Israelis display expansionist tendencies	26.4	44.5	78.3
Israelis display racist tendencies	16.6	39.6	06.9
Unsure	00.7	06.5	14.5
Total	100.1*	100.1*	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

V. Primary Attitudes Toward Peace

This section aims at assessing the respondents' primary attitudes on peace with the Jewish state. Its centrality originates from common sensical assumptions about attitudes that generate appropriate behaviors and allow peace to make roots. In keeping with its stated aim, this section presents and analyzes the findings for following six pertinent dimensions:

(1) Perceptions about Predisposition toward Peace by Leaders Central to the Peace Process;
(2) Perceptions about Arab and Israeli Publics' Predisposition toward Peace;
(3) Desired Scope of Relations with Israelis;
(4) Perceptions about Durability of Peace;
(5) Reasons for Supporting Peace; and
(6) Alternatives to Peace.

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The results for this section appear in table 29 through table 52. Negative according to every dimension and nearly all items, the findings foretell bumpy Arab-Israeli relations even in the presence of formal peace agreements, unless the concerned parties adopt a comprehensive attitude reversal policy. It is necessary, nevertheless, to look carefully into the dimensions, one at a time, and see how they interrelate with independent variables, especially religiosity and SES.

(a) Perceptions about Predisposition toward Peace by Leaders Central to the Peace Process

The collection of the data for this study occurred during the Premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, against a background of stalled negotiations and widespread pessimism in the Arab World about the genuineness of Netanyahu's peace intentions. In view of the exceptionally tough negotiating posture displayed by Netanyahu, an impartial observer may accept the respondents' attitude that he did not really want peace (table 29).

Table 29: Do you think Benjamin Netanyahu genuinely wants peace with Arabs? (N=1600)

	%
He wants peace	02.6
He does not want peace	96.9
Unsure	00.4
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

At the time of data collection Ehud Barak, still a Labor Party aspirant, made it very clear that he intended, if he were to win the Premiership, to diligently pursue peace with Arabs, with the hope of achieving quick results at all remaining tracks and lingering issues. Barak's statement appear to have convinced a only minority of respondents (see table 30 for the results) about his peace intentions. Israeli politicians, it is interesting to note, never succeed in convincing the Arab man on the street about their good peace intentions. It appears as if unwavering anti-Israeli political socialization has left deep impressions in Arab collective consciousness.

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Table 30: Do you think Ehud Barak genuinely wants peace with Arabs? (N=1600)

	%
He wants peace	19.1
He does not want peace	75.4
Unsure	05.5
Total	100

Ghassan Mukahhal, a Lebanese journalist, found no fundamental disagreement on strategic issues between Netanyahu and Barak. The only difference between the two leaders was on perception of Arabs. Mukahhal felt that Barak sounded more arrogant than Netanyahu "... seeing in them [the Arabs] no threat to Israel. He does not even see them as suitable partners, regarding peace with them as a favor from Israel, unlike Netanyahu who considers Arabs as a serious threat that must be properly dealt with by the Jewish state."[64]

Bivariate analysis shows a significant association between the respondents' happiness with the performance of their national government and agreement about the genuineness of Barak's peace intentions. This finding points to the strength of interpersonal distrust in the Arab World.[65] Perception of Israeli leaders' intentions signifies a general malaise, albeit in more acute terms.

Table 31: Relationship between Ehud Barak's Peace Orientation and Satisfaction with the Performance of the Respondents' Governments (N=1600)

	Do you think Ehud Barak genuinely wants peace with Arabs?	
He wants peace n=306	He doesn't want peace n=1206	Unsure n=88

[64] *Al-Safir*, July 10, 1999.

[65] Interpersonal distrust is a common problem in underdeveloped countries, characterized by particularistic tendencies and social fragmentation. These two societal properties hinder social transactions since they categorize persons outside one's immediate group not only as outsiders, but also as suspects.

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Are you happy with the overall performance of your government?

	%	%	%
Very happy	33.3	--	02.3
Happy	35.0	00.2	08.0
Unhappy	21.6	40.0	78.4
Very unhappy	03.9	58.0	10.2
Unsure	06.2	01.7	01.1
Total	100	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, well-known to Arab publics, has failed to win approval by the respondents for his advocacy of peace and and proposal for regional cooperation. Less than one-fifth of the respondents view him as committed to peace (table 32), placing him in the same category with Ehud Barak, unknown to Arabs until the beginning of the electoral campaign that made him Israel's chief executive.

Table 32: Do you think Shimon Peres genuinely wanted peace with Arabs? (N=1590)

	%
He wanted peace	18.9
He did not want peace	75.4
Unsure	05.7
Total	100

The views of Peres on economic interaction do not seem to have endeared him to Arabs, perceiving his motives with profound suspicion. Peres, speaking passionately about the problems of Middle Eastern countries, felt they "... cannot be solved by individual nations, or even on a bilateral or multilateral plane. Regional organization is the key to peace and security, and will promote democratization, economic development, national growth, and individual prosperity."[66] Arab respondents, traditionally suspicious about plans

[66] Peres, *The New Middle East*, 61.

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for the Middle East, do not seem to View with favor Peres's blueprint for regional cooperation. Section VI on conspiracy thinking gives more attention to this matter.

More than 70% of the respondents said they think Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad truly wanted peace with the Jewish state. For years al-Asad had been preparing his people and other Arabs for the possibility of peace, stating that he wanted the peace of the courageous, understood to mean his willingness to recognize the Jewish state in exchange for returning the Golan Heights to Syria. Arabs generally viewed with displeasure their leaders's willingness to negotiate with the Israelis, usually interpreting their peace moves as defeatist. Conversely, they demanded that the Israelis commit themselves to peace, and expected them to make steady statements to that effect.

Table 33: Do you think Hafiz al-Asad genuinely wants peace with Israel? (N=1574)

	%
He wants peace	70.2
He does not want peace	22.9
Unsure	06.9
Total	100

Interestingly, the majority of Syrian respondents did not consider that their their President wanted peace with the Israelis, whereas other Arabs, especially the Lebanese thought otherwise. This significant discrepancy pmay have been related to Syria's state-controlled media and closed society. Even though Syrian mass media outlets regularly referred to a just and comprehensive peace with Israel, they also gave the public the impression that the government was not rushing for peace at any price, a signal which may have been interpreted by the majority of Syrians as indicating a lack of interest in peace. Conversely, Lebanon's open society and privately-operated mass media give the Lebanese access to more independent, and diverse sources of information, on whose basis most

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respondents conclude that al-Asad is interested in peace.[67]

Table 34: Association between Hafiz al-Asad's Genuine Desire for Peace with Israel ând Nationality (N=1574)

Do you think Hafiz al-Asad genuinely wants peace with Israel?

Nationality:	Syrians n=379 %	Lebanese n=398 %	Jordanians n=397 %	Palestinians n=400 %
He wants peace	23.2	93.2	78.3	83.8
He does not want peace	56.2	03.8	17.9	15.3
Unsure	20.6	03.0	03.8	01.0
Total	100	100	100	100.1

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

(b) Perceptions about Arab and Israeli Publics' Predisposition toward Peace

One would expect a century of anti-Jewish socialization to generate strong negative perceptions about Jews in general, and Israel in particular. Arab official policy of shifting from confrontation to conciliation has had little influence on changing the opinion of the Arab public, or even halting the agents of socialization from continuing to disseminate hawkish tendencies.

One of the results of protracted negative socialization has been distrust in Israelis' peace intentions. If most respondents find Israeli leaders unprepared for peace, it would be plausible to assume, as a corollary, that they do not see Israeli citizens prepared for peace either. This is exactly what the results of table 35 demonstrate.

[67] Political discussion takes place in Jordan and the areas of the PA. There, the mass media is fairly more open and richer in content than Syria's, which may explain, at least partially , why the assess the Syrian President's proneness t peace differently than their Syrian counterparts.

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Table 35: Do you think that the majority of Israelis want peace with the Arabs? (N=1600)

	%
Majority of Israelis want peace	19.7
Majority of Israelis don't want peace	75.2
Unsure	05.1
Total	100

The respondents report a significantly higher, though by no means impressive, rate of Arab inclination to peace with Israel. Almost one-third of them feel Arabs have opted for peace with the Hebrew state, representing a 13% increase on perceptions of Israelis' acceptance of peace (see table 36 for the text and distribution of the responses).

Table 36: Do you think that the majority of Arabs want peace with Israel? (N=1598)

	%
Majority of Arabs want peace	32.4
Majority of Arabs don't want peace	66.6
Unsure	00.9
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The Arab mass media, even when admitting that military confrontation is no longer a viable option for Arab, fails to promote peace tendencies among its audiences. By constantly doubting Israeli intentions and focusing on Arab weaknesses, the media reinforces, even escalates already present tense feelings among the majority of Arabs, as the findings seem to suggest.

The picture gets gloomier when the respondents assess their personal views on peace, with about 70% saying no to it; this finding registers a drop of at least 15% from a similar poll administered five

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years earlier.[68] Slow progress toward peace, pessimism about its ability to effect economic prosperity, a spate of fundamentalist terror against civilian targets in Israel, and unrelenting Israeli settlement in the West Bank all seem to have contributed to setting back the endorsement of peace by Arabs – hesitant in the first place – or anticipation of Israeli public's endorsement.[69]

Table 37: Personally, do you want peace with Israelis? (N=1599)

	%
I want peace	28.3
I don't want peace	69.2
Unsure	02.4
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Since the majority of Arabs generally view peace with Israel as taking place under duress, due to their weakness, they tend to express in private and public gatherings determination to undo their humiliation, no matter how long it might take them to do it. Sandra MacKey observed Arabs' fixation on self-respect, which "... bestows worth on life. Shame on the other hand, is like living death. Intolerable to the sufferer, it demands that any loss of honor be avenged."[70] Fathi Kulayb wrote that Oslo and subsequent agreements have not, at all, put the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians on a permanent resolution track. He maintained that the Palestinian people can hardly think about a single gain they made from peace so far. Quite the opposite has been accelerating since Oslo, mainly an alarming rate of Jewish settlement in the West Bank.[71]

Cross-tabulation results (presented in table 38) reveal no major differences between nationality of respondents and approving of

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[68] Khashan, *Partner or Pariah?*

[69] Many respondents told the interviewees that they lost faith in peace as a result of two incidents in 1996: the Grapes of Wrath operation in southern Lebanon which caused unnecessary losses in human lives, and the al- Aqsa Mosque's excavations that triggered a bloody confrontation between the Israeli army and the PA police, leaving dozens dead on both sides.

[70] MacKey, *Passion and Politics*, 69.

[71] *Al-Safir*, September 18, 1998.

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peace, as they ranged from less than 26% (Syrians) to 31% (Palestinians). If anything, they point to the consistency of Arab publics' perceptions about peace in the Middle East, and attest to the reliability of the data.

Table 38: Association between Acceptance of Peace with Israel and Nationality (N=1599)

	Personally, do you want peace with Israelis?			
Nationality:	Syrians	Lebanese	Jordanians	Palestinians
	n=399	n=400	n=400	n=400
	%	%	%	%
I want peace	25.6	29.8	27.0	31.0
I don't want peace	68.4	69.3	70.5	68.8
Unsure	06.0	01.0	02.5	00.3
Total	100	100.1*	100	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The reason is that Arabs, despite their numerous differences, see eye to eye on Zionism and seem to unconditionally accept the notion that it embodies an ideology intent on politically, economically and militarily subjugating the Arabs. A wary 'Abd al-Husayn Sha'ban communicated the conviction that Zionism is an extreme version of colonialism that differs sharply from classical colonialism (characterized by transient military occupation and extraction of the resources of occupied territory) in that it contemplates to permanently occupy everything, from land to resources.[72] Burhan al-Dajani expressed other, more specific reasons for opposing peace. He emphasized the nonnegotiability of the Palestinian question (literally dismissing peace as a strategic option, in spite of perfunctory, yet noncommittal, statements on peace). In elaboration of this, he said that "... Arabs must be extremely careful in negotiating with Israelis. The essence of the conflict with the Hebrew state, i.e., Arabs' claim for Palestine cannot be put on the negotiation

[72] 'Abd al-Husayn Sha'ban, *Al-Qadaya al-Jadida fi al-Sira' al-'Arabi--al-Isra'ili* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutubi li al-Matbu'at, 1987), 37-8.

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table. Put specifically, Arab negotiators have no mandate to relinquish either the right of Palestinian refugees' return, or their property.[73]

If nationality does not associate with proneness to peace, SES and religiosity do correlate. There is a spectacular relationship between SES and peace, with endorsement rates ranging from more than 68% at the upper end of the scale to only five percent at the lower end (see table 39). This finding lends itself to several interpretations, all of which seem plausible. High SES approval rate of peace could mean that the respondents expect to benefit from it; it could also reflect better understanding of reality and appreciation for compromise and the need to bury inconclusive conflict, such as the Arab-Israeli, and move beyond it.[74]

Table 39: Relationship between Socioeconomic Status, Religiosity and Wanting Peace (N=1599)

Do you want peace?	SES scale			Religiosity scale		
	High	Med.	Low	High	Medium	Low
	n=424	n=636	n=539	n=598	n=658	n=343
	%	%	%	%	%	
Yes	68.6	21.1	05.2	19.1	27.1	46.9
No	30.4	78.0	89.4	80.6	72.3	43.4
Unsure	00.9	00.9	05.4	00.3	00.6	09.6
Total	99.9*	100	100	100	100	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Religious respondents' approval rate of peace with Israel totals eight percent minus the sample's average (see table 39 for the text and distribution of the responses). Conversely, high SES respondents

[73] Burhan al-Dajani, *Mufawadat al-Salam: Al-Masar wa al-Khayarat wa al-Ihtimalat* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filistiniyya, 1994), 22.

[74] It might be worth mentioning here that SES correlated very strongly with the question on the sources of information determining the views on the conflict. The vast majority of high SES respondents that they evaluate the situation on their own and draw appropriate conclusions.

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register more than 40% higher than the sample's average. In the Arab World, the opinions of highly religious people (judged by their numerousness) make stronger waves in society than the wealthy, a much resented tiny segment of society.

(c) Desired Scope of Relations with Israelis

Wanting peace is one thing, but translating it into a set of rewarding relationships is another thing. Less than one-fifth of respondents amenable to peace accept developing close ties of cooperation between Arabs and Israelis. The other respondents split nearly evenly between the proponents of regular,[75] little, or no cooperation (the text and distribution of responses appear in table 40).

Table 40: If you want peace with Israelis, what kind of relations would you like to see between them and the Arabs? (N=453)

	%
Close cooperation on a neighborly basis	19.2
Regular cooperation	24.5
Little cooperation	28.5
No cooperation	27.8
Total	100

This finding lends credence to the claim that Arabs want peace, but prefer to avoid contact with anything related to the Jewish state. Arabs realizing that they can no longer sustain the state of belligerency with Israel choose to accept peace with the understanding that it does not generate major interactions with

[75] Regular cooperation here means nothing more than lukewarm relationships between countries have little interests in common. A few years ago a Western journalist asked Syrian President al-Asad about his ideas about relations between his country and Israel in the event of peace. Al-Asad said he wanted regular relations, similar to those between Syria and Panama, for example.

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Israelis. They probably fear it would lead to familiarity and the eventual dissolution of the conflict.[76] Concerned about the negative implications for Arabs from Israel's close contacts with the West, a skeptic Fawzi Mansur backed eschewing all types of cooperation with Israelis on grounds that there is a symbiosis between Zionist ideology and Western capitalist monopolies operating in the Middle East.[77]

(d) Perceptions about Durability of Peace

Table 41 shows just 26% of respondents in support of peace believe in its durability. No matter what reasons explain their pessimism, the fact remains that peace thinking has not established roots, even among the tiny fraction of Arabs agreeable to peace.

Table 41: If you support peace with Israel, do you believe signed agreements will endure? (N=453)

	%
Yes	26.0
No	56.5
Unsure	17.4
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Nonetheless, Table 42 provides specific reasons for the pessimism. Around eight-tenth of respondents willing to give reasons say the major obstruction to durable peace emanates from its imbalanced nature. This means that respondents seeing the terms of peace a reflection of Israeli victories and Arab defeats, tend to treat it as a provisional arrangement.The vast majority of Arabs regard peace with Israel, obviously including many of those who say they accept it, as a

[76] Many Arabs state in private conversations that since they are not capable of resolving the conflict with Israel in favor of Arabs, they should maintain the affective and evaluative elements of the conflict intact until Arabs find themselves capable of concluding the conflict to their advantage.

[77] Fawzi Mansur, "Bunyat al-Tahaluf al-Suhyuni al-Amriki wa al-Mashru' al-Sharq Awsati," in Hilmi Sha'rawi, ed., *Al-Sharq Awsatiyya: Mukhattat Amriki Suhyuni* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1998), 35.

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dishonorable agreement that must be avenged in better times.

Table 42: If you say peace agreements will not endure, mention most important reason? (N=256)

	%
Imbalanced peace	78.1
Islamic militancy	12.5
Jewish militancy	04.3
Lack of interaction	05.1
Total	100

Strong feelings about an uneven peace have encouraged many Arabs to condemn it. Disbelieving that real peace between Arabs and Israelis seemed anywhere within reach, Edward Said stated his reasons in emphatic terms: ".... [T]rue reconciliation cannot be imposed; neither can it occur between cultures and societies that are enormously uneven in power. The kind of reconciliation that can bring real peace can only occur between equals, between partners whose independence, strength of purpose, and inner cohesion allows them fully to understand and share with the other."[78]

More than 90% of high SES respondents (most supportive of peace among the respondents, and most likely to view themselves as benefiting from it) warn about the negative repercussions of an imbalanced peace on its survival. Respondents from lower SES backgrounds prefer to focus on Islamic militancy as table 43 clearly reveals. One can reason that high SES respondents form their opinions on the basis of diverse sources of information, which allow them to see the Arab-Israeli conflict from a broader perspective than the Islamic militancy argument.

[78] Edward W. Said, *Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), xxvi.

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Table 43: Association between Possibly Unenduring Peace Agreements and Socioeconomic Status (N=256)

Most important reason for possibly unendurance of peace agreements

	SES scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=208	n=36	n=12
	%	%	%
Imbalanced peace	90.4	33.3	--
Islamic militancy	01.9	52.8	75
Jewish militancy	03.8	08.3	--
Lack of interaction	03.8	05.6	25
Total	99.9*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

(e) Reasons for Supporting Peace

It is quite understandable that Arabs want back lands currently occupied by the Israeli army. Normally land won in war is returned in exchange for binding relations that make the recurrence of military confrontations most unlikely. What is disturbing is that not even two percent of respondents see peace agreements as a first step toward promoting relations that allow peace to to endure on the basis of mutual interests and consent. Table 44 presents that in addition to expressing desire to regain land, some respondents admit Arabs have no other alternatives at the moment. Others say they need peace to block what they described as Israeli aggression, and the time it grants them to prepare for a future confrontation under more favorable terms for Arabs. These views, registered in previous public opinion polls, have remained unchanged despite official transition to the language of peace, even in Syria and Lebanon which await to sign peace treaties with the Hebrew state.

Table 44: What are your major reasons for supporting a peace agreement with Israel? (N=450)

	%
To recover occupied Arab land	68.0
To block Israeli aggression	11.3
We have no other alternative	12.4

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Gives us time to reorganize	06.4
We can eventually build up real peace	01.8
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 44 gives no conclusive evidence about the majority of the respondents' reasons for supporting peace. It is reasonable to argue that desire to recover Arab land (reported by 68%) does not necessarily preempt the presence of other, possibly positive reasons for supporting peace. But the results appearing in Table 45 immediately dismiss this likelihood. When asked if they would continue to support peace if the balance of power tips in favor of Arabs only 12% say yes. This means that less than four percent of the entire sample of 1600 respondents unconditionally support peace, having accepted it as a strategic choice. For more than 96% of the respondents the legacy of war continues to drag out.

Table 45: Would you continue to support peace if the balance of power tips in favor of Arabs? (N=451)

	%
Yes	12.0
No	81.2
Unsure	06.9
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The fragility of peace does not appear to stop at withholding support for it if conditions on the ground change. It goes to the extent of endorsing military action against the Hebrew state, an option selected by more than 80% of the respondents (see table 46).

Table 46: Would you approve or disapprove of the use of force against Israel if the Arab military situation permits (N=448):

	%
Strongly approve	58.3
Approve	23.9
Disapprove	04.2
Strongly disapprove	09.4
Unsure	04.2
Total	100

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(f) Alternatives to Peace

An impelling question presents itself as a consequence of strong opposition to peace by the majority of respondents and wavering approval of it by the remaining minority. What do they want instead of peace? What they aspire after appears quite simple; just examine table 47! About 80% of the respondents want the Arab-Israeli conflict to go on. Only 13% think time has arrived to bury the wounds of a pernicious conflict, and to commit it to the past.

Table 47: The Arab-Israeli conflict has cost the belligerents many lives and squandered valuable resources that could have been invested in modernization. Do you feel it is time for Arabs to put this conflict behind them and work for a better future? (N=1594)

	%
It is time to bury the wounds	13.1
The conflict must go on	78.9
Unsure	08.0
Total	100

Activation of peace talks in the early 1990s and anxiety about impending agreements have caused tremendous concern among Arab scholars. The past few years have witnessed the emergence of a mainstream literature rejecting peace between Arabs and the Jewish state. Zuhair Diab, reflecting his countrymen's views on the conflict with Israel, said that Syrians believe the confrontation will go on for very long time "... owing to the disadvantageous and imbalanced distribution of power in favor of Israel."[79] Hani al-Hasan felt that the world sees in Arab realism – as far as accepting peace with Israel – an admission of defeat, and that defeated people deserve no rewarding. Furthermore, Israel is not interested in peace beyond securing its vital and strategic interests.[80] When Israeli troops pulled out in October 1995 from Jenine, in the West Bank, Palestinian children chased them with stones, an action (repeated several times

[79] Diab, "The Prospects for Peace between Israel and Syria, 72.
[80] *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 28, 1998.

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later) graphically indicating that the conflict has not really ended.[81]

Table 48: Association between Socioeconomic Status (SES) and Continuation of the Conflict with Israel (N=1594)

Should Arabs put the conflict with Israel behind them?

	SES Scale		
	High n=423 %	Medium n=634 %	Low n=537 %
It's time to bury the wounds	43.0	03.8	00.6
The conflict must go on	53.2	87.7	88.8
Unsure	03.8	08.5	10.6
Total	100	100	100

SES markedly sorts out the respondents on on whether the time has arrived to bury the wounds associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Table 48 displays a division among high income respondents, with a few more of them wanting the continuation of the conflict than putting it to rest. It must be noted that the majority of high SES respondents seem unhappy with the geopolitical environment in which negotiations proceed; yet, somehow, many of them would like to see an end to the conflict. Middle and lower SES groups do not seem to be tormented by having to decide on whether the conflict should proceed, or lay to rest. A quick look at table 48 immediately shows that their thinking is still deeply embedded in the perpetuation of conflict, rather than its resolution.

Table 49 displays that respondents opposed to peace manifest disagreement on how to translate their next move. Although more than half of them demand preparation for another war, the fact that the rest of the respondents fall short of thinking belligerently should be seen as somewhat comforting sign. Thirty years ago, almost all Arabs would have advocated war. There is certainly a hole in Arab

[81] *Al-Qabas*, July 28, 1998.

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thinking with regard to Israel. But of course the march to peace is bumpy, and perceptive shifts are insufficient by themselves. At least, for bow, many respondents content themselves with boycotting Israel. While definitely a strong negative attitude, it is subject to reversal.

Table 49: If you don't want peace with Israelis, how do you want Arab to deal with them? (N=1105)

	%
Just boycott them	24.0
Strengthen Arab posture to lay the ground for a balanced peace	21.8
Prepare for the eventuality of war with them	52.3
Unsure	01.9
Total	100

Bivariate analysis finds that religiosity is a predictor of strategy in confronting Israel. An overwhelming majority of highly religious respondents (about 83%) implore Arabs to prepare for the eventuality of yet another war in the Middle East. The percentage drops sharply as religiosity level declines (see table 50 for the text and distribution of the responses). Crosstabulation has repeatedly shown the salience of religiosity as an inhibitor of attitudinal change on conflict with Israel.

Table 50: Association between Religiosity and Preferred Strategy in Confronting Israel (N=1101)

Strategy for Confronting Israel: Religiosity Scale	High n=577 %	Medium n=420 %	Low n=104 %
Just boycott Israelis	14.7	41.0	05.8
Strengthen Arab posture to lay the ground for a balanced peace	01.7	34.3	82.7
Prepare for the eventuality of war with Israel	82.7	21.2	11.5
Unsure	00.9	03.6	--
Total	100	100.1*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

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It is evident from table 51 that the great majority of respondents approving of the use of military force against Israel would like to see the destruction of the Hebrew state. Once again it is the highly religious respondents who seem far more inclined to endorse this option than their less religious counterparts, as table 52 clearly demonstrates.

Table 51: If you approve of the use of force, how far should the Arabs go in their war against Israel? (N=941)

	%
Recover Arab territory lost in 1967	27.8
Destroy the state of Israel	65.5
As far as Arab armies can go	06.7
Total	100

Most moderately and weakly religious respondents in favor of using military force say they do not endorse its use beyond the recovery of Arab land lost to the Jewish state during the 1967 war.[82]

Table 52: Association between Religiosity and Use of Force against Israel (N=941)

How much force should be used against Israel?: Religiosity Scale

	High n=543 %	Medium n=335 %	Low n=63 %
Force to recover land lost in 1967	02.0	60.9	74.6
Force to destroy the state of Israel	92.6	31.9	09.5
As much force as Arab armies have	05.3	07.2	15.9
Total	99.9*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

VI. Conspiracy Beliefs

Many Arabs unquestioningly believe in political conspiracy. To be sure, petty conspiracy mars the conduct of inter-Arab relations. At

[82] This answer, while milder than the demand for the total destruction of the Hebrew state does not seem to relate to reality. Unrealistic objectives sometimes point out to the existence of a false consciousness at work, usually stemming from atavistic impulses.

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the level of intra-Arab politics, conspiracy has operated as an uncontrollable variable in determining policy outcomes, as well as the rise and fall of leaders and regimes. Believers in conspiracy have extended its utility to incorporate Arabs' interaction with the outside world, namely the West and Israel. A litany of military defeats, intellectual stagnation, underdevelopment and traditional behavior have coalesced to convince Arabs that conspiracy waged by foreigners lies at the heart of their political travails. Thus emerged in the minds of a considerable number of Arabs a narrow world view in which intrigue and malice help in interpreting the past and in predicting the future.

Conspiracy thinking features prominently in the respondents' attitudes concerning Israel's objectives from peace in the Middle East. Table 53 provides information on six perceived objectives, five of which suggest conspiratorial intentions. The weighted scores summarize the respondents' perceptions in the following order: economic dominance, control of water, incitement of Arab conflicts, installing puppet regimes and establishing Greater Israel. These fears do not appear to be isolated reactions, rather a manifestation of rooted perceptions, duly supported by an extensive body of literature.

Table 53: How do you perceive Israel's objectives from peace with Arabs (rank order the three most important objectives)?

	1st N=1596 %	2nd N=1418 %	3rd N=1310 %	
Weighted Scores**				
Economic dominance	56.6	14.9	16.6	68
Control of water resources	13.2	36.4	24.7	38
Incitement of inter-Arab conflicts	12.5	21.5	16.0	27
Create puppet regimes	05.3	07.1	02.1	09
Establish "Greater Israel"	06.7	08.1	30.7	18
Genuine peace	05.7	12.1	10.0	14
Total	100	100.1*	100.1*	

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

**The weighted scores are determined by combining the values of the first, second, and third choices, with first choices assigned twice as much weight as second choices and four times as much weight as third choices.

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Hani al-Hasan interpreted Israeli peace gestures as aiming at transforming its conflict with the Arabs into intra-Arab conflicts relying totally on new issues (such as human rights, political and economic matters, democracy) bereft of content, except fomenting domestic dissent.[83] 'Ala' 'Abd al-Wahhab expressed belief that the Zionist leaders have shifted their strategy from establishing Greater Israel, one that rested on crude territorial expansion to the creation of Great Israel, based on economic control of the Arab East. The main objectives of the revised strategy aimed – apart from total economic, political and military control – at preventing the formation of a Pan-Arab political entity, and maintaining Arab economic underdevelopment.[84] Anis Sayigh seemed quite disturbed by Israel's deep immersion in aspects of cultural and scientific enrichment. He noted with alarm that more than half of the Middle East's internet subscribers are Israelis. Worse still, Sayigh grudgingly talked about Israel's preparation of its school children to become fully integrated in its scientific drive, in which it invests only in order to fully control Arabs. He protested against Israel's heavy expenditure on scientific research, which exceeded what all Arab countries usually spend by thirty times.[85] Wadi' al-Safi, a renowned Lebanese singer went to the extent of saying that Zionism wants to contribute to the destruction of Arab culture by integrating Middle Eastern music with that of the West's, ostensibly to cause the first to lose its character.[86] Tarik al-Majzub, a self-proclaimed water expert, sounded the alarm about an impending Israeli action to totally control all available water resources in the Arab region, including the Nile river. To achieve its devious water policies, Majzub asserted that Israel is mischievously collaborating with Turkey and Ethiopia to make Syria and Egypt kneel.[87]

In what appears to be a self-fulfilling reaction, more than three-fourth of the respondents do not even want to entertain the thought that the Israeli government would deal in good faith with

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[83] *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 22, 1998.

[84] 'Ala' 'Abd al-Wahhab, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Jadid?! Sinario al-Hymana al-Isra'ilia* (Cairo: Sina li al-Nashr, 1995).

[85] *Al-Safir*, October 2, 1998.

[86] *Al-Shira'*, August 19, no. 894, 1999.

[87] *Al-Nahar*, September 30, 1996.

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Arabs, even if they endorse peace as a strategic option. Thinking otherwise would shatter the edifice of preconceived ideas about Jews in general, and the state of Israel in particular. It would also undermine most respondents' value system through which they judgingly interact with the external environment.

Table 54: Say Arabs endorse peace with Israel as a strategic option. Would this interest the Israeli government to deal with them in good faith? (N=1599)

	%
Israel will deal in good faith	07.4
Israel may deal in good faith	13.3
Israel won't deal in good faith	76.1
Unsure	03.2
Total	100

A number of writers defend the view that Israel has a program of action that it seeks to implement, irrespective of Arab publics' proneness to interact with the Jewish state. In this venue, Muhammad al-Jaza'iri denounced the imperialist and Zionist attempts to take advantage of Arab economic difficulties and the general malaise prevailing in most Arab countries; their aim, he adamantly insisted, focuses on the destruction of the Arab mind and culture. Al-Jaza'iri spoke about a hideous plan in which advanced communications channels (internet and satellite T.V.) provide the means of implementation.[88] Halim Barakat, an academician and novel writer of Syrian origin, alleged that Israel does not appear concerned about convincing Arabs that it is willing to give up ambitions to build Greater Israel. In Barakat's words: "It is Israel, who enjoys overwhelming military superiority, who should give assurances to the Arabs and display good intentions toward them.... Instead, it addresses them from a position of civilizational and moral superiority, and as a victim of their irrational aggressiveness."[89]

Israeli good faith relates to SES as table 55 determines. Nearly

[88] Muhammad al-Jaza'iri, "Ihtilal al-'Aql: Al-Tatbi', al-Hisar, Sira' al-Ghad," in Hilmi Sha'rawi, ed., *Al-Sharq Awsatiyya: Mukhattat Amriki Suhyuni* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1998), 31.

[89] *Al-Hayat*, November 22, 1994.

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one-fourth of high SES respondents feel that Arabs should expect the Israeli government to deal with them in good faith in the event of total peace. Even though this percentage sounds unimpressive, comparing it with the percentages reported by medium and low SES respondents shows its significance. Nearly none of the respondents from these two SES strata betrays confidence in Israel's good intentions.

Table 55: Relationship between Good Israeli Faith and Socioeconomic Status (SES) (N=1599)

Will Israeli Government Deal in Good Faith with Arabs?:

	SES Scale		
	High n=424 %	Med. n-636 %	Low n=539 %
Israel will deal in good faith	24.8	01.7	00.6
Israel may deal in good faith	27.6	12.7	02.6
Israel won't deal in good faith	43.4	83.5	93.1
Unsure	04.2	02.0	03.7
Total	100	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

There appears to be consistency in the answers of the respondents. Those providing positive responses on one item, provide similar responses for related items, and vice versa. Again, more than three-fourth of the respondents preclude the possibility of future Arab-Jewish interaction. One college student told this researcher that "the deep past of Arab-Jewish relationships is dead, but the recent past is very much alive."[90] They seem either uninterested in cooperation, or reluctant to believe that Israel would sincerely assist the Arabs.

[90] This remark was made during a workshop on liberalism that took place during the the period of October 1-3, 1999 at Bologna mountain resort, near Beirut.

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Table 56: Israel is a technologically advanced country that can positively reflect on Arab societies in the event of comprehensive peace. Do you see the possibility for genuine Arab-Israeli cooperation, bearing in mind that in past epochs Jews contributed mightily to Arab-Islamic societies? (N=1600)

	%
I see it	21.3
I don't see it	76.0
Unsure	02.7
Total	100

Some Arabs, especially Syrians and Egyptians, see no need for Arab-Israeli cooperation. Sa'd al-Din 'Abd Allah demanded the complete rejection of any Middle Eastern plans (political or economic), arguing that they would deprive Arabs of free will and perpetuate their dependency. Instead, he recommended the creation of an Arab order that takes note of the reasons behind past failures and rectifies them.[91]

There is a striking relationship between SES and perceiving the possibility of Arab-Israeli cooperation. High SES respondents tend to be better achievers than lower SES backgrounds; hence, they are less likely to be obsessed by ideas on conspiracy. Virtually none of the respondents from the medium and lower SES strata say they see close Arab-Israeli cooperation (see table 57). High SES status affords members richer sources of information and immersion in a more cosmopolitan environments, leading to a more permissive political socialization process.

Table 57: Relationship between the possibility for Arab-Israeli Cooperation and Socioeconomic Status (SES) (N=1600)

Do you see the possibility for Genuine Arab-Israeli Cooperation?:

[91] Sa'd al-Din 'Abd Allah, "Al-Badil al-'Arabi," in Hilmi Sha'rawi, ed., *Al-Sharq Awsatiyya: Mukhattat Amriki Suhyuni* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1998), 239.

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	SES Scale		
	High	Med.	Low
	n=424	n=636	n=540
	%	%	%
I see it	71.0	05.0	01.5
I don't see it	23.6	93.9	96.1
Unsure	05.4	01.1	02.4
Total	100	100	100

Respondents precluding the possibility of regional cooperation articulate a basic grievance against Israeli society, arguing that it does not seem quite ready to integrate in the Middle East. This thought is so intense that about 82% of the respondents endorse it, which marginalizes other explanations for the unlikelihood of Arab-Israeli cooperation (see table 58 for more information).

Table 58: If you don't see the possibility of Arab-Israeli cooperation, state why? (N=1216)

	%
Israel doesn't want to become part of the Middle East	81.6
Israel wants to make the Middle East part of Israel	08.8
Cooperation advances Arabs at the expense of Israel	01.3
At heart, Arabs are opposed to it	08.3
Total	100

George Corm maintained that if the Hebrew state truly wants peace it must become an integral part of the region and establish friendly relations with its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, he emphatically demanded Israel to display modesty in communicating with the Arabs and to disavow its settlements policy.[92] Using much stronger terms to communicate his thoughts on Israel's unreadiness for dealing with the Arabs, Hisham Sharabi pronounced the death of Oslo accords, and the persistence of Palestinian suffering. He stated that:

[92] *Al-Nahar*, December 31, 1994.

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> In their opinion [the opinion of the Israelis] we are a backward people who will not catch up with modernity for a very long time. This explains the nature of the racist solution adopted by the Labor Party, which the Likud Party wishes to implement enthusiastically supported by the majority of the Israeli people.[93]

The question of unlikely Arab-Israeli cooperation came under further scrutiny. The author sought to see if it related to the intense religiosity scale. It did! Nearly all moderately and weakly intense religious respondents put the blame on Israel's unwillingness to become part of the Middle East, whereas their highly intense religious counterparts provide more complex responses (see table 59). More than 40% of them claim that Israel wants to make the Middle East part of Israel. About the same percentage call things by their name and confess that, at heart, Arabs are opposed to peace. Judged by available sources of political socialization, in which religious training plays a central role, this response sounds realistic.

Table 59: Association between Preclusion of the Possibility of Arab-Israeli Cooperation and Intense Religiosity (N=1216)

Reasons for not seeing the possibility of Arab-Israeli cooperation	Intense religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=246	n=295	n=675
	%	%	%
Israel doesn't want to become part of the Middle East	21.5	96.3	97.0
Israel wants to make the Middle East part of Israel	40.2	02.0	00.3
Cooperation will advance Arabs at the expense of Israel	--	--	02.4
At heart, Arabs are opposed to it	38.2	01.7	00.3
Total	99.9*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

[93] *Al-Hayat*, August 22, 1997.

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Table 60: Let us accept the argument raised by some Arabs that their countries' economies are much too weak to interact with Israel's in the event of peace. Economic weakness has not prevented Arabs from interacting with countries whose economies are obviously stronger than Israel's. In view of this argument, would you be willing to waive whatever reservations you may have about economic interaction with Israel in the event of total peace with the Arabs? (N=1589)

	%
Will waive reservations	29.3
Will not waive reservations	68.5
Unsure	02.1
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Arabs fear that economic interaction with Israel will place Arab economies, thanks to Israel's central location in the region, in a severe economic jeopardy. Mahmud 'Abd al-Fadil noted with favor a fundamental change in Israel's economic thinking, namely what he said represented a shift from the concept of zero sum game to positive non-zero sum game. He voiced displeasure, nonetheless, about Israel's export share (about 50 percent) from the proposed free economic zone slated to include – in addition to Israel – Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the PA.[94] What distinguishes interaction with strong economies other than Israel's pertains to the respondents' fear that Israel seems intent on predominance. Surprisingly, most respondents evince unawareness that Israel's specialized economy is already linked to the interdependent economies of industrialized countries.

[94] Mahmud 'Abd al-Fadil, "Hisab al-Makasib wa al-Khasa'ir al-Istratijiyya," in Hilmi Sha'rawi, ed., *Al-Sharq Awsatiyya: Mukhattat Amriki Suhyuni* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1998), 94-5. 'Abd al-Fadil ignored the fact that Israel's GDP exceeds the combined GDPs of the other five political entities.

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Table 61: Relationship between Waiving Reservations about Economic Interaction with Israel and Socioeconomic Status (SES) (N=1589)

Willingness to waive reservations about economic interaction with Israel in the event of total peace: SES Scale

	High n=422 %	Med. n=631 %	Low n=536 %
Will waive reservations	20.8	05.2	
Won't waive reservations	24.4	76.9	93.5
Unsure	02.8	02.4	01.3
Total	99.9*	100.1*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 62 honestly displays Arab apprehensions about economic interaction with Israel. The weighted scores clearly points to the strength of fears about Israeli economic predominance. This is immediately followed by a conspiratorial notion about Israel's prevention of Arabs from modernizing their economies, a popular thought in many Arab circles.

Table 62: If unwilling to waive reservations about economic interaction with Israel, could you state your reasons (state the two most important reasons in a ranking order)?

N=1046 Scores**	1st %	2nd %	Weighted N=1088
Israel wants to predominate economically	47.6	30.3	63
Israel will never allow Arabs to modernize their economies	19.8	19.6	30
Israel's economic structure is incompatible with Arab needs	18.5	21.6	29
Israeli economy is not as competitive as Western or Far Eastern economies	14.2	28.5	28
Total	100.1*	100	

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

**The weighted scores are determined by combining the values of the first and second choices, with first choices assigned twice as much weight as second choices.

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Very few respondents express empathy with the victims of the Holocaust, as table 63 unmistakably reveals. This could be attributed, in the most part, to a popular idea in the Arab World that the Holocaust never took place. Arab conventional wisdom has it that the Holocaust exists only in the minds of Zionist leaders who like to use imaginary Jewish suffering to promote their schemes.

Table 63: Do you empathize with the Jews, especially the victims of the Holocaust? (N=1575)

	%
Yes	17.7
No	82.3
Total	100

Hazim Saghiyya disapprovingly recognized the failure of Arabs to make an effort to understand the question of Eastern European Jewry and the Holocaust; he felt that empathy with Jews would go a long way in improving Arab-Israeli relations.[95] But Saghiyya's voice is an isolated incident that mainstream Arab writers seek to silence. They do not see Jews as victims deserving empathy, since the Arab collective mind has for a very long time identified Jews in general, and Israelis in particular, as aggressors deserving nothing more than condemnation.

Table 64 reflects the mood of respondents failing to empathize with Jews. They regard Jews as culprits, therefore unworthy of humane feelings. They treat the Holocaust as if it never happened; short of that, they rationalize their feelings on grounds that Jews were conspiring against Nazi Germany. Other respondents seem satisfied to withhold empathy from Jews because they see them as enemies. 'Aida al-'Ali Sariyyeddine puts the blame on Zionism, the source of all evils: "Zionism has planted in Jews collective hate, which has spread into all aspects of Jewish life. The Jewish press is rife with expressions of grudge, hate and violence... Jews derive pleasure from killing and bloodshed."[96]

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[95] Saghiyya, *Difa'an 'an al-Salam*, 63.

[96] 'Aida al-'Ali Sariyyeddine, *Al-Hiqd al-Suhyuni fi 'Anaqid al-Ghadab* (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 1996), 40-1.

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Table 64: If answer is "No" state why? (N=1291)

	%
The Holocaust never occurred	53.0
The Jews were conspiring against Germany	32.4
They are my enemy	14.6
Total	100

Empathy for the victims of the Holocaust correlates inversely with religiosity. Nearly three-fourth of irreligious respondents say they empathize with Jews, as opposed to less than three percent for the highly and moderately religious respondents (see table 65 for the distribution of the results). These results seem to indicate the presence of a strong divide among Arabs centering on the strength of religion on shaping views not just on issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but on unrelated issues as well.

Table 65: Relationship between Empathy with Jewish Victims of the Holocaust and Religiosity (N=1575)
Do you empathize with the Jews, especially the victims of the Holocaust?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=581	n=652	n=342
	%	%	%
Yes	02.1	02.9	72.5
No	97.9	97.1	27.5
Total	100	100	100

Meron Benvenisti tried to understand how Arabs, namely Palestinians, feel toward Israelis. He detected a pervasive sense of frustration and resentment for Israelis, magnified by a sense of utter helplessness. He argued that Israeli occupation of Arab territory and constant wounding of Arab pride apparently have made already existing hostile perceptions worse. Benvenisti reported the experience of a West bank Palestinian with Israeli troops: "Your soldiers and

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policemen treat us with terrible crudity – blows, slaps, kicks...[and] torture during interrogation."[97]

Table 66 summarizes the respondents' notion for stabilizing the Middle East. Two-thirds of them demand checking Israeli conspiracies. The last third of respondents recognize practical and more tangible variables, i.e., Islamic militancy and the issue of democratization. Once again, responses here bring to attention divisive issues, pertaining to political participation and the place of religion in politics, that do not appear to have neared resolution.

Table 66: The key to stability in the Middle East lies in (N=1585):

	%
Curbing Islamic fundamentalists	13.8
Democratizing the Arab world	20.6
Checking Israeli conspiracies	65.7
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

VII. Support for Islamic Militancy

The preceding analysis has shown the crucial role of religiosity in associating with various attitudinal aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this section, the author shifts the analysis to examine the respondents' support for the militant activities of certain Islamic organizations against the Jewish state. This section is especially important because the activities of militant Islamic groups are behavioral, not attitudinal.

The Israeli Administration of Prime Minister Ehud Barak has made it clear that it intends to pull out Israeli troops from southern Lebanon with, or without peace. In response to a question on whether Hizbullah should continue to attack Israelis after they leave Lebanon, nearly 55% of the respondents say yes (see table 67)

[97] Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 12.

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Table 67: If Israel pulls out its troops from Lebanon, should Hizbullah continue its attacks against Israeli targets"? (N=1600)

	%
Yes	44.1
No	53.4
Unsure	02.6
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Religiosity clearly influences the responses with regard to the continuation of military operations against Israeli troops. About 85% of highly religious respondents approve of continuing the operations, compared to a quarter of moderately religious respondents and only one-tenth of irreligious respondents (see table 68 for the distribution of the responses).

Table 68: Relationship between the Continuation of Hizbullah's Operations against Israel and Religiosity (N=16000

If Israel pulls out its troops from Lebanon, should Hizbullah continue its attacks against Israeli targets?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=598	n=658	n=344
	%	%	%
Yes	84.8	24.5	10.8
No	13.2	72.5	86.6
Unsure	02.0	03.0	02.6
Total	100	100	100

Israelis are not alone in having to confront the Islamic fundamentalist wrath. Table 69 shows that more than 63% of the respondents support Islamic groups' militant activities against Arab governments.

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Table 69: In general, do you support the militant activities of Islamic groups against certain Arab governments ? (N=1510)

	%
Strongly support	26.4
Support	26.8
Do not support	19.9
Strongly do not support	26.0
Unsure	01.0
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

There is a strong inverse relationship between SES and support for the fundamentalists" attacks against Arab governments, as table 70 vividly displays. Quite expectedly, high SES respondents, though some of them may articulate grievances against the national government, do not approve of violence. Naturally, they prefer peaceful means to improve the performance of government.

Table 70: Relationship between Support for Militant Islamic Activities against Arab Governments and Socioeconomic Status (SES) (N=1510)

In general, do you support the militant activities of Islamic groups against certain Arab governments?

SES Scale	High n=406 %	Medium n=612 %	Low n=492 %
Strongly support	12.1	17.8	48.8
Support	14.3	32.5	29.9
Don't support	20.2	26.3	11.6
Strongly don't support	53.0	22.7	07.9
Unsure	00.5	00.7	01.8
Total	100.1*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

It transpires that there many adversaries to the fundamentalists. The list includes – but it is not limited to – Israel, Arab governments, business people and members of Arab intelligentsia. Complex and

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overlapping problems have prevented them, thus far, from forging a nuclear alliance to stem the fundamentalist tide. Religion in the Arab World is heavily politicized, even when religious people themselves do not subscribe to political groupings. This is not to say that religion should be discouraged. Individual preferences must be respected, including unobstructed religious expression. However, rationality and inquisitiveness must assume a greater share in the school curricula and the mass media outlet need to display responsibility and professionalism in presenting information.[98] Consider, for example, the results that appear in table 71 about the influence of religiosity on supporting militant activities against national governments. While the performance of most Arab governments is far from adequate, sponsorship of militancy – an option selected by more than 95% of highly religious respondents – indicates impulsion and inadequate consideration of the complexity of a situation.

Table 71: Relationship between Support for Militant Islamic Activities against Arab Governments and Religiosity (N=1510)

In general, do you support the militant activities of Islamic groups against certain Arab governments?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=557	n=623	n=330
	%	%	%
Strongly support	55.5	10.8	06.7
Support	39.7	27.8	03.0
Don't support	02.2	28.9	32.7
Strongly don't support	01.8	31.1	57.3
Unsure	00.9	01.4	00.3
Total	100.1*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

[98] Ghazi Sirhan, a Professor at the American University of Beirut who has numerous contacts with Lebanese journalists, relayed to this author journalists' admissions to him about unprofessional behavior in reporting news and commenting on them. One of their main concerns seems to arouse their audiences with fantastic analyses on the basis of inaccurate, or grossly exaggerated news items.

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A large majority comprising 87% of the respondents support the militant activities of Islamic groups against the state of Israel (table 72). Probably, this very strong rate of support is attributable to stagnation in the peace talks and the general mood of pessimism about the ability, or willingness, of former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to strike peace deals with Arabs.

Table 72: Do you support the militant activities of Islamic groups against the state of Israel? (N=1561)

	%
Strongly support	36.5
Support	50.5
Do not support	06.3
Strongly do not support	06.3
Unsure	00.4
Total	100

Table 73 displays disturbing results. More than 60% of high SES respondents support the anti-Israel militant activities; almost all middle and lower SES respondents approvingly answer this question. A ranking official in Hizbullah told this author that during the Grapes of Wrath Operation the Party received generous contributions from wealthy businessmen, including $ U.S. 500,000 from a Maronite Christian, who stipulated that the money be used to purchase Katyusha missiles to shell Israeli settlements in northern Israel. The official also noted a similar upsurge in contributions following Hizbullah attacks that result in Israeli fatalities.[99]

[99] The author chooses to keep the name of the official anonymous, since he has not been able to reach him at the time of writing this section to obtain permission for a citation.

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Table 73: Relationship between Support for Militant Islamic Activities against Israel and Socioeconomic Status (SES) (N=1561)

Do you support the militant activities of Islamic groups against the state of Israel?

	SES scale		
	High n=412	Medium n=623	Low n=526
	%	%	%
Strongly support	10.0	33.4	60.8
Support	51.0	61.6	36.9
Don't support	19.9	01.9	01.0
Strongly don't support	19.2	02.7	00.4
Unsure	--	00.3	01.0
Total	100.1*	99.9*	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

VIII. Building Bridges with Israelis

So far, the official march toward peace in the Middle East has ignored transforming bellicose attitudes by ones more favorable to the maintenance of peace, as well as its growth into mutually rewarding sets of diverse relationships. Building bridges of peace entails economic, cultural, touristic and educational cooperation, to name but a few aspects of interaction that make peace sticks. Needless to say, there is a lot of work that must occur at the level of average people in probably all Arab countries, especially Israel's immediate neighbors. Hazim Saghiyya begged Arabs to begin to think dispassionately about establishing healthy relations with the Hebrew state.The following excerpt summed up his ideas:

> Why cannot we think about relations of economic integration with a very strong economy [Israel's]? .... why cannot we think about benefiting from Israel's contacts with the West and the capabilities of Jews, their modern technological skills and Israel's parliamentary

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experience? Let us accept Jews as a new addition to the mosaic of populations in the Arab region.[100]

In soliciting attitudes on personal reaction to official inauguration of Arab-Israeli economic interaction, the respondents give mixed, frequently inconclusive answers (see table 74 for the text and distribution of responses). One-third of them will not contest, another third will boycott, and the last third seems uncertain, pending community reaction. This finding brings to the fore the importance of the community in shaping the views of the respondents. It also highlights the strength of the collective nature (as opposed to the individualistic) in the formation of the attitudes of many respondents.

Table 74: How would you react if your country decides to normalize economic relations with Israel? (N=1600)

	%
Will welcome the decision	17.0
Will accept it as a *fait accompli*	19.9
Will boycott Israeli products	31.7
My reaction will depend on how the community responds	31.4
Total	100

Association between reaction to normalization and factors influencing views on the conflict shows that respondents forming their opinions on their own appear decisively inclined to welcome normalization. Conversely, respondents depending on the community for opinions, say they prefer to wait for community reactions before stating their opinion (see table 75 for full presentation of the results).

[100] Saghiyya, *Difa'an 'an al-Salam*, 54.

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Table 75: Association between Reaction to Normalization of Economic Relations with Israel and Factors Influencing Views on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (N=1600)

How would you react if your country decides to normalize economic relations with Israel?

Most important factor determining your views on conflict with Israel

	[Myself]	[Relatives]	[Peers]	[Community]	[Leaders]	[Israel]	
	n=	n=	n=	n=	n=	n=	
	219	427	205	410	211	128	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Decision welcome							
	91.3	--	07.3	04.4	09.0	15.6	
Accept as *fait accompli*							
	01.8	23.9	31.7	--	18.5	84.4	
Boycott Israeli products							
	06.8	55.7	47.3	01.0	72.5	--	
Reaction depends on community response							
	--	20.4	13.7	94.6	--	--	
Total	99.9*		100	100	100	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The respondents appear equally divided on encouraging Israel's peace movement (table 76).

Table 76: Israel has a strong peace movement. Do you think Arabs should encourage this trend in Israeli society? (N=1594)

	%
Arabs should encourage this trend	48.4
Arabs should not encourage this trend	50.9
Unsure	00.8
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The Hebrew state's vibrant peace movement apparently has not

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impressed Anis Sayigh, who described the split in Israeli society on the issue of peace as transient, hence deserving little attention. His main worries had nothing to do with Jewish proneness to peace, but with what he considered as their government's enormous spending on science and technology.[101] It is difficult to imagine that spending on science and technology should weaken Arab resolve to commit themselves to peace! The implicit idea pertains to weak Arab investment on research and knowledge. It would have been more rational for Sayigh to implore Arabs to invest more on science and compete with Israelis, than to view the latter's effort in this regard as having dubious intentions.

Responses to this question reveal a split among the ranks of respondents on the basis of religious commitment. Table 77 manifests that while less than four percent of the highly religious respondents feel that Israel's peace movement deserves encouragement, more than three-fourth of moderately and weakly religious respondents think so.

Table 77: Relationship between Arab Encouragement for Israel's Peace Movement and Religiosity (N=1594)

Do you think Arabs should encourage Israel's peace movement?

	Religiosity scale		
	High n=597	Medium n=655	Low n=342
	%	%	%
Encourage	03.5	75.0	75.7
Do not encourage	96.0	24.7	22.2
Unsure	00.5	00.3	02.0
Total	100	100	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

About one-fourth of respondents uninterested in encouraging peace trends in Israel, say the country's pace movement is not genuine. More than half of them express pessimism about the movement's ability to change anything on the ground. The rest, more

[101] *Al-Safir*, September 25, 1998.

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than one-fifth of the respondents, bluntly say that peace does not concern them (see table 78).

Table 78: If you think Arabs should not encourage Israel's peace movement, state your main reason? (N=811)

	%
Movement is not genuine	24.9
Encouraging Israeli peace movements will change nothing	52.7
Peace with Israel doesn't concern me	22.4
Total	100

Table 79 gives the impression that irreligious people express extreme doubts about Israel's peace movement. This is not the case. These respondents represent a minority of irreligious respondents, most of whom tend to identify with leftist political groupings. Most respondents from the other two religious categorizations appear more pessimistic about the peace movement's ability, not its intentions.

Table 79: Association between Lack of Encouragement for Israel's Peace Movement and Religiosity (N=811)

State main reason for not encouraging Israel's peace movement?

	Religiosity Scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=573	n=162	n=76
	%	%	%
Movement is not genuine	13.4	33.3	93.4
Encouragement will change nothing	56.2	61.7	06.6
Peace with Israel doesn't concern me	30.4	04.9	--
Total	100	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Tables 80 through 90 furnish information on the respondents' willingness to involve themselves in interactional behavior that carries

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the potential of familiarizing Arabs and Jews and thawing the ice of mutual misunderstanding. The respondents do not seem ready to do it yet. In fact, their responses do not show improvement since the 1994 similar poll. Respondents do not express interest in seeing Israeli visitors on Arab land (the best scores came from irreligious respondents with a 40% approving rate), strongly oppose spending their vacation in Israel, prefer not to take advanced career courses there, and eschew acquainting themselves with aspects of Hebrew life (about 65% of irreligious respondents said yes). A tiny minority report interest in learning Hebrew, and a similar segment accept to to study relevant aspects of Jewish history. Neither Israeli radio or T.V. stations seem to interest the majority of respondents.

Table 80: What would be your reaction to seeing Israeli visitors in your country? (N=1584)

	%
I would welcome them	12.9
They would anger me	32.2
They would sadden me	31.6
I would react indifferently	23.3
Total	100

Table 81: Association between Reaction to seeing Israeli Visitors and Religiosity (N=1584)

What would be your reaction to to seeing Israeli visitors in your country?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=596	n=654	n=334
	%	%	%
I would welcome them	01.7	09.8	39.2
They would anger me	53.9	28.4	00.9
They would sadden me	28.9	47.2	05.7
I would react indifferently	15.6	14.5	54.2
Total	100.1*	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

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Table 82: Would you be willing to spend your vacation in Israel? (N=1600)

	%
Yes	25.9
No	72.6
Unsure	01.5
Total	100

Table 83: Would you attend a career development course in Israel? (N=1321)

	%
Certainly	15.2
Possibly	18.3
Only if I have to	19.5
Never	43.1
Unsure	03.9
Total	100

Table 84: Would you consider sending your children to study in Israel? (N=1499)

	%
I believe I would	08.8
I would if they cannot get a better offer	18.1
I would only if they receive a scholarship	18.7
Never	50.6
Unsure	03.7
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

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Table 85: Would you be interested in acquainting yourself with certain aspects of life in Israel? (N=1598)

	%
Certainly	06.7
Possibly	12.1
Unlikely	19.7
Never	60.3
Unsure	01.3
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 86: Relationship between Acquaintance with Aspects of Life in Israel and Religiosity (N=1598)

Would you be interested in acquainting yourself with certain aspects of life in Israel?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=598	n=657	343
	%	%	%
Certainly	--	--	31.2
Possibly	01.2	11.6	32.1
Unlikely	17.6	25.6	12.2
Never	80.4	61.6	22.4
Unsure	00.8	01.2	02.0
Total	100	100	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 87: Would you be willing to learn Hebrew? (N=1599)

	%
Certainly	04.3
Possibly	06.3
Unlikely	27.3
Never	61.5
Unsure	00.6
Total	100

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Table 88: Would you be willing to look into Jewish history from an Israeli perspective? (N=1578)

	%
Certainly	04.7
Possibly	05.4
Unlikely	13.3
Never	75.9
Unsure	00.6
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 89: How often do you listen to Israeli radio broadcast? (N=1467)

	%
Regularly	02.8
Occasionally	03.5
Rarely	04.5
Never	89.2
Total	100

Table 90: How often do you watch Israeli TV stations? (N=1179)

	%
Regularly	08.7
Occasionally	09.1
Rarely	04.0
Never	78.3
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

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Opposition to normalization of relations seems logical during the early stages of peace, especially by the party perceiving itself as weak. Anger, frustration and fear replace direct military confrontation. The more the rewards of interaction appear to be uneven, the more acute the resentment. But as interaction proceeds and the terms of interaction improve for the weaker party, attitudes tilt toward moderation. In an expression of anger and resentment, Jordanian Writers' syndicate adopted, on August 19, 1994, a code of honor for resisting all aspects of normalization of relations with Israelis, officials and individuals. Its lengthy statement of intent regarded the establishment of the Jewish state as a first step in an ambitious Zionist scheme to rule the Middle East and prevent the happening of Arab renaissance. In a gesture demonstrating frustration, Jordan's writers announced the impossibility of peace with Israel, considering its very presence as a nemesis to real peace.[102]

Tables 91 through 94 assess the respondents' readiness for humanitarian cooperation. More than three-fourth of them would not accept Israeli offers of assistance during emergencies or natural disasters. This finding does not seem all that negative, since it probably reveals cultural differences. Accepting help is an admission of need which many Arabs, in their constant search for dignified solutions to problems, may find demeaning. Aid coming from Jews, Arabs' most hated enemy for many decades, would further illustrate the extent of Arabs' self-perceptions of weakness. This is not so for two-thirds of the Palestinian respondents who confirm their willingness to accept Israeli assistance.[103] On the brighter side, 57% of the respondents accept to provide assistance to Israelis should they become distressed by natural disaster, even though highly religious respondents appeared less forthcoming on this matter than the less religious.

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[102] In al-Jaza'iri, "Ihtilal al-'Aql: Al-Tatbi', 90-2.

[103] Frequent interaction with Israelis for more than three decades must have enhanced mutual familiarity, which makes it less difficult to accept assistance. There is also a psychological dimension to the matter. Palestinians feel that Israelis owe them a lot, since the creation of the Jewish state transformed Palestinians into refugees, mostly living under bleak conditions.

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Table 91: Should your political leaders accept Israeli offers of assistance in the event of a natural disaster in your country? (N=1578)

	%
Yes	08.2
Only if it is absolutely necessary	14.5
No	74.3
Unsure	03.0
Total	100

Table 92: Association between Acceptance of Israeli Offers of Assistance and Nationality (N=1578)

Should your political leaders accept Israeli offers of assistance in the event of a natural disaster in your country?

	Nationality			
	Syrians n=392 %	Lebanese n=395 %	Jordanians n=393 %	Palestinians n=398 %
Yes	--	--	06.1	26.4
Only if it's absolutely necessary	--	--	17.3	40.5
No	94.1	97.7	74.6	31.4
Unsure	05.9	02.3	02.0	01.8
Total	100	100	100	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

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Table 93: Should Israelis receive assistance from Arabs if they ask for it in the event of a natural disaster in their country? (N=1600)

	%
Yes	25.9
Only if it is absolutely necessary	31.9
No	34.3
Unsure	07.9
Total	100

Table 94: Provision of Relief Aid to Israelis in Distress and Religiosity (N=1600)

Should Israelis receive assistance from Arabs if the ask for it in the event of a natural disaster in their country?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=598	n=658	n=344
	%	%	%
Yes	12.7	34.8	32.0
Only if it's absolutely necessary	17.2	39.5	42.7
No	67.7	19.6	04.4
Unsure	02.3	06.1	20.9
Total	99.9*	100	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

The respondents answered questions on economic interaction in the section on conspiracy thinking. The following two questions (tables 95 and 96) deal with this issue from the dimension of need and benefit. Only one-fifth of them say Israel has something to offer the Arabs in their struggle to develop economically. The sweeping majority of the respondents (85%) nurture the opinion that economic cooperation will be more beneficial to Israelis than Arab.

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Table 95: Do Arabs need to develop economic relations with Israel? (N=1577)

	%
Yes, Israel has a lot to offer to Arabs	20.5
No, Arabs can do without Israeli know-how	77.5
Unsure	02.0
Total	100

Table 96: Who would benefit more from economic relations between Arabs and Israel? (N=1600)

	%
Both would benefit equally	04.7
We would benefit more	06.6
Israel would benefit more	85.3
Unsure	03.5
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Once again, Hazim Saghiyya lamented Arab publics' antipathy toward peace with Israel, this time in the guise of aversion to normalization:

> Arabs have equated economic normalization with exploitation, cultural normalization with the invasion of conscience, and branded political normalization as capitulation.... When some Israelis suggested disbanding Zionist identity by proposing Middle Easternism, we accused them of attempting to swallow us, and when others said they should not go ahead with a regional order, we accused them of arrogance.[104]

Opposition to normalized economic interaction interpreted solely from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict may lead to erroneous inferences. Xenophobic suspicion ought not to be

[104] Ibid., 57-8.

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dismissed by serious analysts, since may apply to nationalities other than the Israeli, as well. The finding gives a a clue about the weakness of Arab thinking in global terms, which is partially attributable to the fact that Arab ruling elites and the media they control do not seem to have adopted a supportive stand toward it.

IX. Peace Promoters

A conflict may last for a very long time, but it is bound to terminate eventually. Hopefully, this can happen sooner than later, at least to spare human lives and property from destruction, if for nothing else. Every conflict has cracks through which erstwhile enemies can bridge the gap between belligerence and peace. Considering the Middle East and the nature of challenges confronting it as a region, the economic dimension remains the most lucrative inducement to make possible the transition from the legacy of war to the promise of cooperation.

Table 97 supplies information on the possibility of respondents reconsidering opposition to peace if they receive assurances that it will benefit the Arabs. The results seem very encouraging as half of the say they would reconsider their position in this event.

Table 97: If you oppose peace with Israel but receive assurances that it will economically benefit the Arabs, will you then reconsider your opposition? (N=1106)

	%
I will reconsider	49.8
I won't reconsider	48.4
Unsure	01.8
Total	100

In consistence with all previous items, highly religious respondents display a weaker predisposition to interact, or to reconsider the views they hold (see table 98). This does not imply that religious people do not change their attitudes, but it may take them longer to adjust their views and in the process, separate between spiritual and earthly matters. What starts as a core value insusceptible to change may, in due course, become an attitudinal

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preference amenable to change in a conducive environment.[105]

Table 98: Relationship between Reconsideration of Opposition to Peace and Religiosity (N=1106)

If you oppose peace with Israel but receive assurances that it will economically benefit the Arabs, will you reconsider your opposition?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=480	n=466	n=160
	%	%	%
I will reconsider	24.4	69.7	68.1
I won't reconsider	73.5	28.5	30.6
Unsure	02.1	01.7	01.3
Total	100	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

It seems that many more respondents accept the principle of Arab-Israeli economic cooperation than personal involvement in it. This is not an unusual finding. Endorsement of a principle normally precedes its widespread application. Table 99 find that less than 19% of the respondents appear already ready for direct personal participation with Israeli individuals. This finding should manifest SES differences.

Table 99: In the event of total peace, would you be interested in transacting business with individual Israelis? (N=1590)

	%
Yes	18.5
No	79.5
Unsure	02.0
Total	100

[105] A conducive environment her implies mutually rewarding interactions, e.g. economic.

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Table 100 does indeed show a marked relationship between transacting business with individual Israelis and SES. A look at the table shows a clear descending order of interested respondents. Nearly half of high SES respondents express favorable inclination toward doing business with Israelis, as opposed to 10% of medium SES respondents and less than five percent of respondents at the low SES end.

Table 100: Relationship between Transacting Business with Israelis and Socioeconomic Status (N=1590)

In the event of total peace, would you be interested in transacting business with Individual Israelis?

	SES scale		
	High n=421	Medium n=633	Low n=536
	%	%	%
Yes	49.2	10.1	04.3
No	50.1	88.5	91.2
Unsure	00.7	01.4	04.5
Total	100	100	100

Tables 101 through 104 probe further possibilities for enlisting the respondents' approval of economic cooperation with Israelis. Almost 50% of respondents opposed to interaction say they would change their minds if Arab countries enhance their power position in relation to Israel. When it comes to deriving personal gain from cooperation the rate of support jumps to about 58%. Interestingly, only eight percent of highly religious respondents would be induced by personal gain, whereas nearly all less religious counterparts register their acceptance. Finally, a total of 55% of the respondents say beneficially rewarding experiences by other Arab countries would prompt them to endorse cooperation.

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Table 101: Say Arab countries enhance their power position in relation to Israel. Would that motivate you to waive whatever reservations you may have about interaction between Arabs and Israelis? (N=1236)

	%
Yes, it would motivate me	49.4
No, it wouldn't motivate me	47.9
Unsure	02.8
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 102: If you still oppose peace but receive assurances that it will benefit you personally, will you then reconsider your opposition? (N=1104)

	%
I will reconsider	57.9
I won't reconsider	40.6
Unsure	01.5
Total	100

Table 103: Relationship between Reconsideration of Opposition to Peace in the Case of Personal Benefit and Religiosity (N=1104)

If you still oppose peace but receive assurances that it will benefit you personally, will you then reconsider your opposition?

	Religiosity scale		
	High n=482 %	Medium n=474 %	Low n=148 %
I will reconsider	07.9	95.6	100.0
I won't reconsider	88.6	04.4	--
Unsure	03.5	--	--
Total	100	100	100

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Table 104: Say you are opposed to peace, but the Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese conclude financially rewarding terms for peace with Israel, would you then support opening a new chapter of relations with the Jewish state? (N=1102)

	%
Yes	54.5
No	43.6
Unsure	01.8
Total	99.9*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

X. The Role of the United States

Arabs know about the special relations between the U.S. and Israel, and they realize that there is very little they can do to erode it. When the respondents were were asked to assess the role of the U.S. in mediating the peace talks between Arabs and Israelis, only nine percent say the U.S. performs as an honest broker, with less than seven percent of them arguing that the U.S. is actually of the Arabs' side (see table 105).[106] Arab scholars are media commentators seem united in condemning the role of the U.S. in the peace process.

Table 105: How do you see the role of the U.S. in mediating the peace talks between Arabs and Israelis? (N=1588)

	%
The U.S. performs as an honest broker	09.0
The U.S. is more on the side of Israel	83.1
The U.S. is more on the side of Arabs	06.4
Unsure	01.5
Total	100

Most Arabs tend to bitterly accuse the U.S. of imposing on them peace that strongly satisfies Israeli conditions and reflects its military superiority, made possible by generous American assistance. In view

[106] All respondents saying the U.S. takes sides with Arabs are West Bank Palestinians.

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of this, the trend among Arab populations is to predict the survival of conflict, albeit in a new form, i.e., economic, cultural and social.At the same time when the U.S. pressures Arabs to modify their attitudes to make peace with Israel workable, it does nothing at all – thus goes the argument – to encourage Israelis to abandon their bellicosity.[107] Edward Said contributed to mainstream Arab writings on the role of the U.S. in imposing peace according to Israeli terms:

In the present situation Israel has managed to convince the Arabs, and in particular the exhausted Palestinian leadership, that equality is impossible, that only peace on Israeli terms and those dictated by the United States is possible. Years of unsuccessful wars, empty bellicosity, unmobilized populations, and incompetence and corruption at every level bled the life out of our societies, already crippled by an almost total absence of participatory democracy and the hope that goes with it.[108]

Mousa al-Mizzawi (a Palestinian lawyer) complained about the absence of a fair arbiter for resolving conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel consistently rejects arbitration, claiming that the two sides should be able to settle their differences on their own.[109]

Unfavorable assessment of U.S. role has not convinced most respondents that Washington should cease to involve itself in the peace talks (see table 106). Respondents probably feel that if this were to happen, Arab bargaining position, weak to begin with, will get even weaker without U.S. presence on the negotiating table.

Table 106: Should the U.S. continue to involve itself in the peace process? (N=1581)

	%
The U.S. should continue	61.8
The U.S. shouldn't continue	36.4
Unsure	01.8
Total	100

There is an inverse relationship between the continuation of U.S.

[107] *Al-'Alam*, no. 8, August 1999.
[108] Said, *Peace and its Discontents*, xxvi.
[109] *Al-Hayat*, March 30, 1998.

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role in mediation and religiosity, a quite expected finding that conforms to the pattern of responses throughout the study (see table 107 for more details).

Table 107: Relationship between Continuation of U.S. Involvement in the Peace Process and Religiosity (N=1581)

Should the U.S. continue to involve itself in the peace process?

	Religiosity scale		
	High	Medium	Low
	n=590	n=651	n=340
	%	%	%
The U.S. should continue	36.9	69.4	90.3
The U.S. shouldn't continue	62.5	29.3	04.4
Unsure	00.5	01.2	05.3
Total	99.9*	99.9*	100

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Table 108 shows that the respondents display very limited prospects for U.S. role in the peace talks. Their responses shift between pressuring Israel and pumping financial aid, obviously to Arabs. Mediators should perform a role beyond exerting pressure and giving money to sway hesitant negotiators. They can, for example, provide counsel, encourage rational thinking, explore horizons for cooperation and introduce workable confidence building measures.

Table 108: In your opinion, what should be the role of the U.S. in the peace talks? (N=1572)

	%
Pressure Israel to more accommodate Arab demands	14.6
Provide economic aid to make peace work	26.9
Pressure Israel and provide aid	58.5
Total	100

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XI. Building Confidence in Peace

It appears as if the march toward peace between Arabs and Israelis is proceeding, despite numerous hurdles, at a faster rate than the ability of Arab publics to come to terms with dramatic changes on the ground. True, there are pockets of resilience and shaky bridges of good hope, but the challenges are real and fundamental. On the brighter side, the study has shown that SES promises to pioneer Arab attitudinal change. Still, SES is directly related to the state of the economy; in this regard, the performance of most Arab regimes remains less than satisfactory. Religiosity, especially when it is intense, seems to keep the greater parts of Arab publics focused on confrontation, and deeply enmeshed in the literature that keeps it alive and well.

A good number of analysts gave the issue of obstacles to peace and building confidence in it concentrated attention. Karim Paqraduni, a ranking official in the Lebanese Phalangist Party, reminded us that Arab ruling elites seem more ready to accept peace with the Jewish state than their populations. He noticed that, for Arabs, the idea of peace still needs to crystallize, for they do not seem to be able to make a distinction between peace and surrender. Not used to gradual peace agreements, they demand that they obtain a full and comprehensive peace, or none at all.[110]

Curtis Ryan dealt with the disappointment of many Jordanians following the signing of peace with Israel. Many Jordanians patiently awaited the dividends of peace that never arrived. The unforthcomingness of economic benefits eroded the meager support for peace in Jordan.[111] It is clearly understood that improved economic conditions seem to promote peace thinking. Nevertheless, it is not at all desirable to insist on providing financial incentives to facilitate transition to peace. First of all, peace must reflect understanding of a changing world in which interest is rapidly shifting from concern for historical conflicts to issues of global concern. Second, there are both structural and behavioral problems with most Arab economies. Arab ruling elites must deal with serious, really

---

[110] *Al-'Alam*, no. 8, August 1999.

[111] Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process: From War to Peace with Israel," in Ilan Peleg, ed., *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1998), 173.

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painful, economic reform than base their public policy decisions on acquiring foreign aid. The argument made here does not pretend that foreign economic aid is useless, rather it should be part of a comprehensive policy that identifies, among other things, long-term policies. In a realistic study, Jamil Hilal warned against linking between peace and economic prosperity, seeing the former only as a secondary factor. He determined that the underlying variables behind the economic underdevelopment of the Arab World are essentially unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[112]

Ofira Seliktar recognized key political problems that seem to bog down Arab regime. She advocated regional cooperation through reviewing the impact of economic integration on fostering an atmosphere of understanding, cooperation and confidence between erstwhile enemies, citing Western Europe and the Pacific region as living examples. Nevertheless, she identified two central political variables as the primary obstacle to Middle Eastern economic cooperation namely, legitimacy and nationalism.[113] Seliktar sounded quite optimistic about the ability of the new global economy to induce appropriate sociopolitical changes in hesitant Arab countries.[114] But the challenges facing Arabs require painful, yet unavoidable, reforms.They must successfully confront what Stanley Fischer saw as bloated public sectors and severe limits on foreign trade. He saw no escaping from introducing comprehensive market-oriented reforms.[115] This is the main reason why foreign aid, given as an incentive to sway hesitant elites and angry publics, cannot induce real transition to peace. At best, it gives beleaguered ruling elites time out from their political travails, but not for very long.

Thinking on another wave length, Zuhayr Diab, a Syrian scholar, hypothetically proposed finding a symbiosis between Zionism and Arab nationalism in a binational state, or a community of nations.[116] This argument deviates from reality and fails to contribute, by

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[112] Jamil Hilal, *Istratijiyyat Isra'il al-Iqtisadiyya li al-Sharq Awsat* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filistiniyya, 1995), 7.

[113] Ofira Seliktar, "The Peace Dividend: The Economy of Israel and the Peace Process," in Ilan Peleg, ed., *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1998), 223.

[114] Ibid., 224.

[115] In Seliktar, "The Peace Dividend...," 228.

[116] Diab, "The Prospects for Peace between Israel and Syria, 75.

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emphasizing ideal approaches to conflict resolution, to serious discussion. Fredrik Barth and Unni Wikan focused on the importance of changing attitudes to make peace stick: "Most directly relevant to peace between peoples are the conversations that bridge the division between those peoples."[117]

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev assumed that the path to peace reduces hate and contempt, promoting positive attitudes instead. This is contingent, he insisted, on identifying pursuits – ordinarily economic – of common interests. Peace, he cautioned, does not eliminate anger or frustration, rather exacerbate them as they linger on indefinitely. In conclusion, he noted that peace should hold firm so long the parties to it perceive it as a strategic choice.[118] Many of the findings of this study showed that respondents display a great deal of frustration and anger. Attention should be given to creating the appropriate domestic environment (involving political and social change) that qualifies it to become an integral part of mutually rewarding economic interaction.

It goes without saying that peace building in the Middle East is difficult. We do not know the answer, but we can surely experiment with variables until a workable instrument of peace becomes implemental. The results of peace will benefit Arabs, and by extension will extinguish an ungainly conflict that has dragged on for no obvious strategic objective.

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[117] Fredrik Barth and Unni Wikan, "The Role of People in Building Peace," in Joseph Ginat and Onn Winckler, eds., *The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle: Smoothing the Path to Peace* (Brighton, Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 113-14.

[118] Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, 102-5.

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Appendices

Appendix A: SES Items and Factor Loadings

Education (N=1600)

	%
College	37.5
Secondary/vocational	43.8
Elementary or less	18.8
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Occupation (N=1600)

	%
Professional	27.0
Semi-professional/vocational	46.8
Laborer/farmer	26.3
Total	100.1*

*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding

Income (N=1600)

	%
High	22.3
Medium	36.9
Low	40.8
Total	100

Factor Analysis Using Varimax Rotation

Education	0.64	
Occupation	0.56	
Income		0.49

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Appendix B: Religiosity Items and Factor Loadings

How do you feel about the devoutness of your religiosity? (N=1600)

	%
Highly religious	32.9
Religious	39.3
Irreligious	18.6
Highly irreligious	09.2
Total	100

How often do you perform your regular religious obligations? (N=1600)

	%
Regularly	43.6
Occasionally	29.0
Rarely	16.6
Never	10.8
Total	100.0

Factor Analysis Using Varimax Rotation

Devoutness	0.43
Obligations	0.37

Appendix C: Intense Religiosity Items and Factor Loadings

To what extent does religious belief influence your lifestyle? (N=1600)

	%
To a great extent	25.1
To a moderate extent	29.0
To a little extent	25.6
None	20.3
Total	100

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Does religious belief contribute to shaping your general political views? (N=1600)

	%
Strong contribution	23.6
Moderate contribution	26.4
Little contribution	19.7
None	30.3
Total	100

Do you tend to display your religious belief? (N=1600)

	%
Always	10.7
Frequently	14.4
Infrequently	31.0
Never	43.9
Total	100

Factor Analysis Using Varimax Rotation

Lifestyle	0.45
Views	0.41
Display	0.34

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The Future of the Gulf

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

CONTENTS

List of Tables : Acronyms : Introduction
Chapter I The Future of the Gulf Monarchies
Economic systems
Political regimes
The succession question
Military security
Conclusion
Chapter II The Future of Iraq
Domestic settings
Regional players
Shia'as
Kurds
Water resources
Oil policy
Security
International scene
Future of Iraq: Concluding remarks
Two less-likely scenarios
Two more-likely scenarios
Chapter III The Future of Iran
Domestic environment
Economic structure
Political system
Regional Settings
International scene
Conclusion : Bibliography

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Chinese Space Power

James H. Hughes
Englewood, Colorado

The author notes the growth of Chinese military power and its extensive interest in missiles and space research. He takes the view that China may be planning to supplant the U.S.A. as the dominant world power, and examines the prospects for an adequate U.S. defense in the event of a future military conflict with China.

Key Words: China, U.S.A., space, space satellites, space defense, ballistic missiles, lasers, Peoples' Liberation Army

China's ballistic missile buildup underscores its growing military capability and plans to dominate space. Under the leadership of its communist government, China's growing military power appears to have one object in mind, the displacement of the United States[1] as the world's leading power, and the elevation of China, the world's most populous nation.[2] Taking Taiwan may be an intermediate step in that process. Space power is the key to China's planning to supplant the United States.[3]

China's emphasis on developing space power dates largely from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq owed much of its success to satellites in space. U.S. satellites served as valuable force multipliers. Satellites provided the coalition forces under General Norm Schwarzkopf with vital reconnaissance information, GPS navigation, communications, launch warnings of Scuds, and up-to-date weather information.[4]

The 1991 Persian Gulf War also showed the vulnerability of military forces and countries to ballistic missiles – a second aspect of

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[1] Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, *Red Dragon Rising*, Regnery Publishing, 1999, pp. 198-199. Also, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, 1997.

[2] Frederic N. Smith, "Should China be Considered an Adversary of the United States," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 19-25.

[3] Communist China's Defense Minister reportedly declares war with the U.S. "is inevitable:" *New American*, February 14, 2000, p. 7.

[4] John Hutt Cunningham, "The Role of Satellites In the Gulf War," *The Journal of Practical Applications in Space*," Vol.2, No. 3, Spring 1991, pp. 43-69.

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space warfare as ballistic missiles travel through space. Scud hunting became an unexpected diversion for the coalition, taking more aircraft than anticipated.[5] The U.S. was fortunate to have the improved Patriot air defense on hand so it could defend against Saddam Hussein's Scuds, obtaining a moral victory over the threat, and partial victory in interceptions.

The Gulf War victory demonstrated the critical importance of satellites to advanced technology warfare – the method of warfare adopted by the United States after World War II. Satellites are critical military assets. The fear inspired by the Iraqi Scud and resources spent to defend against the Scud also demonstrated the value of the ballistic missile, and importance of space. Space had become a new theater of warfare.

The Military Importance of Space

The influence of space is seen in the U.S. "Revolution in Military Affairs." U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications in the 1991 Persian Gulf War owed much to satellites in space. The U.S. "Revolution in Military Affairs" was a result of the U.S. possessing the high ground of space for the placement of its satellites. Chinese PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the U.S., and seek to use space for its own advantage.

Another influence of space is in its demand and application of advanced technology. The U.S. has poured billions of dollars into developing advanced technology for space, and military satellites. These satellites have been described as "crown jewels" in America's military assets. As jewels, they can be stolen from the U.S. Their usefulness can be denied. Just as importantly, China's successful acquisition of U.S. advanced technology (dutifully recorded in the 1999 Cox Commission Report and March 2000 CIA and FBI Report on Chinese Espionage) has enabled the Chinese PLA to manufacture advanced military technology of similar quality.

The industrial and technological ability of the Chinese PLA is being aided by the return of Chinese students trained at American universities in advanced technology, sciences, and engineering. These

[5] General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take A Hero*, A Bantam Book, 1992 (reprint 1993), pp. 484-486.

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students are a resource for providing the PLA with up-to-date technical information, and technological expertise. In addition, the successful penetration of U.S. defense national laboratories and key American aerospace companies, and the location of American aerospace manufacturing plants and equipment on Chinese soil, has assisted the PLA in acquiring U.S. military and aerospace technology.[6]

This acquired U.S. advanced technology will find an application in China's control and domination of space – in building advanced PLA space launch vehicles and satellites,[7] and forces for the control of space such as high energy lasers, electromagnetic pulse weapons, and high powered microwave weaponry for ASAT (Anti-Satellite) interceptors.[8]

PLA Control of Space

Chinese PLA control of space may be achieved through its development of ASAT forces for denying space to the U.S., or other countries, and by advancements in space launch vehicles and satellites. PLA control of space would be crowned with the launch of a Chinese manned space station, and manned space program.[9] Other PLA ambitions in space, taking advantage of the discovery of water on the Moon (discovered by the U.S.), may be fulfilled. Here, the PLA's strategic alliance with Russia must be acknowledged. Russia is providing China with proven space station technology.[10]

PLA control of space will be aided by its development of long range ballistic missiles, threatening the United States in limited, precision attacks, and counterforce. Precision attacks may be anticipated from the PLA's development of its DF-31 and DF-41 road mobile long range ballistic missiles, and its JL-2 submarine

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[6] *The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor*, May 1997, pp. 5-6.

[7] Craig Covault, "Chinese Facilities Show Major Space Buildup," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, December 6, 1999, p. 38.

[8] Chinese ASAT: James T. Hackett, "No Space Weapons Vacuum," *The Shield*, July/August 1999, p. 7.

[9] Craig Covault, "Manned Program Advances Chinese Space Technology," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 29, 1999, pp. 28-30.

[10] Chinese/Russian strategic relationship: "Sunburned," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 17, 2000, p. 35.

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launched ballistic missiles.[11] Thanks to U.S. nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, and technology transfers from Russia, these new weapons may be equipped with accurate warheads, and may be capable of attacking U.S. forces with a high degree of accuracy. Rather than B-2 bombers, the Chinese PLA is building ballistic missiles for global engagement.

PLA doctrine for the projection of power has been aided by its development of intermediate range ballistic missiles for attacking U.S. bases in the Far East and Pacific: South Korea, Japan, and Guam.[12] The PLA may also use its intermediate range missiles to threaten other countries to provide the PLA with an umbrella for PLA rapid occupation of areas of strategic interest, including potential oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea.

China, now a major importer of oil, needs new energy resources – more oil and gas – to supply its industrialization.[13] These resources may be found in the South China Sea. They may include the Spratly Islands,[14] Paracel Islands, and Natuna Islands. Since Indonesia, racked by economic, political, and religious turmoil, may be unable to field substantive military forces to defend the Natuna Islands, which are producing oil and gas, China may sense a moment of opportunity to force its claim to Indonesia's Natuna Islands oil and gas fields.[15]

China's acquisition of oil and gas resources may be accommodated by the joint interaction of PLA space power, ballistic missile forces, air power, and naval forces. China's domination of space and its ballistic missile forces may enable it to establish Chinese hegemony in the Far East.[16]

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[11] Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing U.S. Missile Defense," No. 1268, The Heritage Foundation, April 7, 1999, pp. 1-6.

[12] Jack Spencer, *The Ballistic Missile Threat Handbook*, The Heritage Foundation, 2000, p. 24.

[13] Patrick Collins, Yuliman Purwanto, Xu Chuang Ji, "Future Demand For Microwave Power from Space in China and Indonesia," *Space Energy and Transportation*, Vol. 4, Nos. 1,2, 1999, pp. 48-51.

[14] Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 139-143.

[15] Captain Anton Nugroho (Indonesia), "The Dragon Looks South," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 2000, pp. 74-76.

[16] Chinese plans for island hopping and claims for territorial sovereignty: Dr. Peter Kien-hong Yu, "Wei-Chi: The Game of War," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 2000, pp. 18-20.

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U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are progressing in a manner that, from the PLA's viewpoint, does not threaten China's buildup of ballistic missiles, although China's propaganda warfare is long on its criticism of a U.S. missile defense. President Clinton has gratuitously limited U.S. theater missile defense capabilities – Navy Theater Wide and Thaad – by imposing arbitrary restrictions on interceptor velocities and restricting the use of target acquisition information provided by other sensor platforms – primarily satellites.[17] Furthermore, given the nonchalant reaction of President Clinton to the rocket motor test of the PLA's new DF-31 ballistic missile when he visited Communist China in June 1998,[18] it may be safely surmised that the U.S. is sound asleep to China's missile buildup. And surprise is half the battle. Sun Tzu would be proud. The U.S. news media, following the lead of President Clinton, has downplayed the PLA's military modernization program, and ballistic missile buildup.

The strategic planning of U.S. ballistic missile defense programs is very favorable to China. U.S. missile defense planning is first focused on defeating only small rogue nation threats 2 – North Korea, and then Iran. China is not even mentioned in U.S. missile defense planning, adding to the element of surprise the PLA may be able to achieve by seizing the initiative.[19]

Moreover, the U.S. National Missile Defense which is planned – a hundred interceptors deployed in Alaska – will be unable to stop PLA ballistic missile strikes on the U.S. East Coast. It will be unable to stop Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) strikes launched offshore the United States.

A U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) may also be defeated directly by decoys, which have been tested, and by cooled warheads for reducing infrared signatures, which may be anticipated from Russian technology transfers. A U.S. NMD may also be defeated by

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[17] The Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense (chaired by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper), *Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat*, The Heritage Foundation, March 1999, pp. 19-22.

[18] Bill Gertz, *Betrayal*, Regnery, 1999, p. 95.

[19] Major Mark A. Stokes, USAF, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999, p. 9.

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the select use of ASAT interceptors or high energy lasers directed against U.S. early warning satellites – shortening the time available for a U.S. response.[20]

PLA emphasis on ballistic missiles forces will maximize its fighting effectiveness. Since the United States lacks any space based ballistic missile defenses and plans to wait until the year 2005 to deploy a limited, rudimentary ground based interceptor NMD, the PLA may be assured of possessing in its ballistic missiles a technologically advanced force capable of inflicting a decisive defeat on the U.S.

Furthermore, the U.S. does not plan to deploy theater missile defenses until possibly the year 2010. It does not plan to deploy any space based defenses until after the year 2010, provided it overcomes objections to the outdated 1972 ABM Treaty.[21] The Chinese PLA may have a free ride to victory using its ballistic missile forces. This free ride to victory will be assured through the year 2005. It may be likely to last through the year 2010, discounting the effectiveness of the rudimentary ground based NMD being built in Alaska.

The PLA development of its Type 094 ballistic missile carrying submarine and JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM),[22] and development and testing of decoys are master strokes of strategy. China may be capable of defeating a U.S. ballistic missile defense through the year 2010, and perhaps even through the year 2020.

The lethargic state of U.S. space based missile defense programs augers well for the PLA. Space based defense programs would pose the greatest threat to China's missiles because of their boost phase defense capability, length of engagement over nearly the whole trajectory of a ballistic missile, and the opportunity to use directed energy weapons effectively. Fortunately for the PLA, the U.S. is not pursuing space based defenses except as a token.

Furthermore, PLA espionage would the keep PLA fully informed of any American progress. This would allow the PLA ample time to

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[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 117-123.

[21] Mr. Clinton has said the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty is the "cornerstone" of strategic relations with Russia and must be preserved. Bill Gertz, "Clinton signs bill for missile defense," *Washington Times*, July 29, 1999.

[22] A. D. Baker III, *Combat Fleets of the World 1998-1999*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1998, pp. 112-116.

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stir up political opposition against these programs, and devise countermeasures against a U.S. space defense. Since U.S. satellites are generally unshielded from electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or lasers, the PLA may be able to disable U.S. satellite and communication networks.

Navy Theater Wide

If the United States moves ahead with an accelerated Navy Theater Wide missile defense program as proposed by the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Security Policy, retiring Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations,[23] and Ambassador Henry F. Cooper (former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization under President Bush), such a defense may still be defeated. For example, PLA missile cruisers (Sovremenny class purchased from Russia) may use their supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn cruise missiles to sink Aegis cruisers and destroyers.[24] Alternatively, Chinese PLA Kilo class submarines or the PLA Type 093 nuclear attack submarine may be able to sink these ships.

Although the Aegis cruiser possesses a powerful suite of ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) weapons, these cruisers may be vulnerable to submarines because of the decline in U.S. ASW training, support, underwater sonar and patrol aircraft, and ASW escort vessels.[25] The Aegis cruiser itself may become a target. Moreover, the U.S. has apparently not developed adequate countermeasures against the wake homing torpedo, or the rocket torpedo China has purchased from Russia. Aegis may be vulnerable.

Even if the U.S. supplemented its ground based NMD interceptor with Navy Theater Wide by basing Aegis cruisers in home port or on the Great Lakes which would reduce the exposure of Aegis cruisers or destroyers to cruise missile or submarine attack, such a defensive posture could be defeated by countermeasures that would be similar

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[23] "First By Sea," *Wall Street Journal*, April 10, 2000.

[24] Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 166-167.

[25] Captain Bruce Linder, "ASW as Practiced in Birnam Wood," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1996, pp. 62-66. Commander Joseph Lodmell, USN, "It Only Takes One," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1996, pp. 30-33. Lieutenant Commander John Pollin, "A Wake-Up Call for ASW," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1996, pp. 80-81.

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to those used against the Alaska NMD ground based interceptors.

Space Based Defenses

Fortunately, from the viewpoint of the PLA, the U.S. sees its current and potential space based ballistic missile defense programs as technologically more demanding than its ground based defense programs. U.S. defense planners apparently fail to understand the technological maturity of their own space systems.

This mis-understanding works to the advantage of the PLA. It reduces the U.S. incentive to use space for its defense. Concern over the ABM Treaty helps as well. While the U.S. has successfully developed sophisticated reconnaissance satellites, it has failed to use space to its full advantage for ballistic missile defense, even though space based ballistic missile defenses are technologically feasible for the U.S. and would provide the most effective missile defense possible.

The eight year hiatus in the U.S. space based missile defense programs (1993-2001) has worked out well for the PLA. Among other cuts, President Clinton cancelled its Brilliant Pebbles space based interceptor program in 1993, allowing the PLA room to build ballistic missiles without being threatened by a boost phase defense in space.

The U.S. Space Based Laser program has been more troublesome, however. In spite of large funding cuts initiated in 1993, the program continued making progress, successfully completing its ground testing phase on October 22, 1997.[26] Yet this program has suffered from awkward management delays, and a common perception that the Space Based Laser should follow the AirBorne Laser.

It is worth noting how American service rivalry is helping the PLA. The Space Based Laser (SBL) is apparently seen as a competitor to the AirBorne Laser (ABL) by the Air Force. The Air Force also runs the SBL program with BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization). The Air Force is evidently unable to appreciate the differences in application between the two, and has

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[26] Space Based Laser program success: "Lockheed Martin and TRW beaming with first operation of Space Based Laser," *Lockheed Martin Astronautics News*, Number 24, November 17, 1997, p. 6.

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apparently has given the less effective ABL more funding compared to the SBL. As a belief that the SBL is essentially a derivative of the ABL pervades even senior Pentagon management,[27] there is very little likelihood that the U.S. will actually deploy or even test the SBL in space until China has prepared itself.

In addition, the U.S. is funding the SBL program at nominal amounts. Its funding is too low to become a serious program, and offset the PLA's ballistic missile buildup. Americans appear to be more concerned with domestic programs, or a balanced budget instead of their own defense. Neglect of the SBL follows a pattern established for nearly a decade of defunding advanced technology defense programs. There should be little concern over a U.S. SBL becoming reality. Hence, as Sun Tzu would have observed, the misunderstandings of an opponent about his own strengths and abilities are working to his own disadvantage.

ASAT

PLA domination of space will be achieved by an attack on U.S. satellites combined with an increase in PLA communication and reconnaissance satellites, improved PLA space launch capabilities, a PLA manned space station program, and commercial suppliers of intelligence grade satellite information. Front cover operations will be able to funnel commercial satellite information to PLA intelligence. Strategic cooperation with Russia will now pay off as key intelligence information will be available from specialized Russian reconnaissance satellites. China's alliance with Russia will enable the PLA to maintain a sophisticated level of satellite reconnaissance.

A Chinese attack on American satellites may use a high level of selectivity based on high energy ground based lasers, or ASAT interceptors equipped with microwave weapons to create a local electromagnetic pulse to disable U.S. satellites. PLA military doctrine prefers the American approach of precision targeting against select, key targets, which new ASAT interceptors with precision generated EMP will be able to provide. Shrapnel may also be used to destroy satellites, a technology Russia has developed.[28]

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[27] Dr. Hans Mark, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, letter to Congressman Bob Schaffer, March 2, 1999, p. 2.

[28] Mark Wade, *Encyclopedia Astronautica*, website, last update June 10, 1999, ASAT.

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To break down U.S. decision making, battle management, command and control, and satellite networks, the PLA may use a saturation attack on U.S. satellites achieved through a combination of jamming, ground based laser attacks, and ASAT interceptors. Disguised scientific and communication payloads releasing ASAT interceptors or space mines may be coordinated with a ground based laser. Space mines may be maneuvered into position near U.S. satellites. Pre-positioning space mines may take place over a period of months or even years. The lack of a U.S. space defense will simplify this operation.

Summary

The wisdom of China's long history spanning over 4,000, its population of over a billion people, and the leadership of China's communist party and PLA can enable China to take its rightful place among nations. Chinese space power can help China deny the U.S. use and access to space. It will let China use its ballistic missiles practically unopposed. China's communist government will be able to assert its "rightful" claims. And there is no one to stop the PLA.

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Global War and the Human Population Problem

Joseph Barter
Los Angeles

The author examines the likelihood that global war, utilizing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, will halt the ongoing destruction of Earth's biosphere by human overpopulation and industrial activity. After summarizing the current state of the global environment, he speculates on what will happen if present trends continue and then examines the possible impact of such a war as a natural counterbalance to human destruction of the biosphere. He concludes by addressing the question of the size and composition of a sustainable human population.

Key Words: Ecology, biosphere, world overpopulation, migration, endangered species, weapons of mass destruction, global war.

The current threat to life in the biosphere is of overwhelming dimensions.[1] The planet is currently experiencing the greatest mass extinction of species since the time of the dinosaurs, 65 million years ago, and it is being caused solely by mankind's massive numbers and industrial activity.[2] Most of the species extinction is being caused by rampant destruction of wildlife habitat, such as forests and wetlands. In other cases, species are being deliberately singled out for destruction, as in the case of rhinoceros horn (for Yemeni dagger handles), or tigers and leopards (for traditional medicine in China, Japan, and other East Asian countries), or whales (for Japanese whale-meat shops).

Apart from causing the extinction of thousands of other species by depriving these life forms of their natural habitat, mankind's

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[1] This article synopsizes the book, *Can America Survive?* (Reference 1), an on-line version of which is available at the Internet web site http://www.foundation.bw . That book contains detailed discussion of the concepts discussed here, and an extensive bibliography. The primary data source for the points made in this article is the World Bank's World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Other data sources are cited in *Can America Survive?*

[2] See *The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and the Future of Humankind*, by Richard E. Leakey and Roger Lewin, Anchor Books / Doubleday, 1996; also "The Sixth Extinction," *National Geographic*, February 1999.

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increasing numbers and industrial activity are causing such great changes to the atmosphere that numbers of concerned scholars are today warning that it is conceivable that all advanced forms of life on the planet's surface could be extinguished in a relatively short time.[3] Industrial gasses are poisoning the atmosphere to such an extent that the ozone layer that protects all biological life from extreme radiation is being destroyed. These gasses are contributing to global warming. Signs of global warming are dramatic and ubiquitous.[4] And as the masses of Asia increase in number and industrialize, the rate of ecological damage is rising rapidly.

Without denying the possibility that the ongoing explosion of the human population, exacerbated by increasing industrial activity, may result in the catastrophic destruction of the planet's biosphere, it has to be admitted that the human species is at the very least causing a tremendous and irreversible changes in global biodiversity. Of the 5-30 million species on the planet's surface, an estimated 30,000 are currently being exterminated every year. With each passing year the world becomes a less and less varied and interesting place to be. Mankind is in the process of destroying, in an instant of evolutionary time, the global environment in which it evolved and on which it depends.

At the very least, human overpopulation and increasing industrial activity are causing the extinction of large numbers of other species, and could potentially lead to the biological death of the planet. This destruction began with the advent of modern technology several centuries ago, and accelerated tremendously with the advent of the petroleum age. The human population continues to grow by about 1.3 percent a year, and economic activity (industrial production) is increasing by about three percent per year. With ecologically diverse forests being destroyed at the rate of 16 million hectares per year, the pace of destruction is relentless.

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[3] For details on the current state of the world, refer to the annual Worldwatch Institute publication, *State of the World*, or the World Resources Institute's annual publication, *World Resources*.

[4] See the web site http://www.climatehotmap.org for a description of the global-warming picture (also reported in "Greenhouse Effects," *Time*, December 13, 1999). See also http://scian.com/explorations/2000/041700warmocean ("The Heat is On," by Sarah Simpson, Scientific American) and http://www.vision.net.au/~daly ("Still Waiting for Greenhouse" by John L Daly).

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Current Trends, and What Will Happen if They Continue

The world total human population is exploding. In 1999 it passed the six billion mark, and it increases by about 80 million every year. It will continue to do so not just because birth rates in many areas are far above the "replacement" level of 2.1 children per female in her lifetime, but also because of population "momentum" (the continued growth of a population at replacement-level fertility because previous generations of higher fertility have not yet had all of their children). Birth rates have fallen throughout the developed world and in developing nations, but very slowly among the latter and rarely to replacement level. Population continues to increase in many developing countries despite below-replacement fertility levels, because of immigration. Current estimates by the United Nations and the World Bank indicate that the world population will continue to increase for decades, even if human birth rates were to drop rapidly to replacement level everywhere. Under the most optimistic assumptions about fertility decline, the human population will increase by another fifty percent in the foreseeable future – to some nine billion people. If birth rates do not drop to replacement level, the population will continue to soar to ever-higher levels.

History offers no cause for optimism that the human population explosion will spare any portion of the world. Underdeveloped nations continue to grow in population until they simply run out of natural resources and cause total destruction of their forests and wildlife. The overpopulated regions then seek to export their excess population to the more developed industrial nations, where, as a result, population currently continues grow at about one-half of one percent per year. Everywhere, it seems, mankind is striving for maximum economic growth, regardless of consequences to the local environment or to the planet's ecological well-being.

The world's forests, in which many of the current plant and animal species reside, are being destroyed as a direct result of the expanding human population. The destruction of the forests is currently the prime cause of much of the ongoing species extinction. Around 94 percent of the forest that existed just sixty years ago, circa 1940, has already been destroyed (60 billion hectares then, 3.6 billion now). In the past 20 years, forests have disappeared altogether in 25

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countries.[5] At these rates, most of Earth's natural forest cover will soon be gone. As human population continues to increase, the demand for land and aged timber will increase, so that the destruction of the shrinking forests will accelerate.

From the point of view of the exploitation of the world's natural resources, the U.S. population is the most destructive nation on Earth, since its industrial activity is the largest. Its population is large and its industrial production per person is one of the highest in the world. Its per capita commercial energy consumption is one of the highest in the world. Although birth rates in the U.S. fell to replacement level years ago, U.S. population growth now soars by about three million a year, due mainly to immigration and the higher birth rates of recent immigrants. For each new immigrant added to the country, about an acre of land is taken permanently out of wildlife habitat or agricultural production.

Despite the damage that its growing population and industrial activity are causing to the planet's environment and its own natural resources, the U.S. has no plans to reduce its per capita energy consumption, to reduce its industrial production per capita, or to reduce its population. Its policy, quite the contrary, is to increase both the population and the per capita industrial production, as rapidly as possible, regardless of the consequences to the planet's biosphere. As global population size, industrial production, and consumption rise, an ever-greater pressure is placed on the environment, polluting the planet's biosphere and driving more species into extinction as their natural habitat is polluted or literally taken away from them.

All nations of the Earth strive for increased economic and industrial activity. While we have pointed to the impact of the U.S., it is equally serious to note that China, the Indian sub-continent and southeast Asia, with far larger populations (together amounting to more than half of the world's total population) are industrializing rapidly, and have already caused vast ecological destruction and widespread pollution within their own regions.

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[5] Data from World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development (also reported in "A Non-Fuzzy Earth Day" by Pranay Gupte, *Time*, May 3, 1999). See also *FAO Yearbook: Production* (annual), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy, for detailed land-use data.

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Perhaps the simplest readily available measure of industrial activity is the amount of commercial energy consumed, which is usually measured in terms of kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe). Over the past few decades, the commercial energy consumption of the planet has increased at an average rate of about three percent a year, somewhat less in recent years. Note that this is about the same as the rate of increase of economic activity as measured by the standard measure, gross domestic product (GDP). Without energy, there is no industrial activity.

At the present time, about one-sixth of the planet's population has a high level of industrial production, and the rest of the population is striving to achieve high levels also. What this means is that, in the absence of war or other phenomena to reduce industrial activity, the level of industrial production will continue to increase even if the human population tapers off. The annual GNP per capita of the richest nations is on the order of about $25,000 (GNP per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) current international dollars), whereas for poor countries it is about $2,000 per year. The world average is about $6,000. At a growth rate (in industrial production) of three percent a year, it would take the rest of the world about fifty years to catch up to where the developed countries are today. This means that even if the human population were to level off by 2050, global industrial production would continue to increase throughout this period, even if the developed nations "stood still" and the poorer nations just tried to catch up. Given the commitment of all nations to the increased standards of living associated with increased industrial production, global industrial production is bound to continue to soar as poor countries strive to become rich. Under the current world order, industrial production will continue to soar to higher and higher levels, and the massive destruction of the environment that is caused by industrial activity is likely to intensify.

In summary, even under the wildest assumptions about decreasing fertility rates, human population levels will continue to rise, and industrial activity will soar exponentially, for generations to come. The destruction to the biosphere will continue unabated. The planet's biosphere and biodiversity – already reeling from mankind's assault – are doomed.

Unless events impose a radical change upon humanity.

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Disease, Drought, Starvation, War and Man-made Weapons of Mass Destruction

We continually see the impact of disease, drought, starvation, natural disasters and warfare on human populations in the most overcrowded areas. Ethiopia is entrenched in war against Eritrea while hundreds of thousands of its members face drought, starvation and warfare. Africa is seeing the spread of HIV infection. But so far these "horsemen of the apocalypse" are having no effect from the point of view of halting the human global population explosion and the resultant destruction of the planet's environment. What can stave off impending disaster? What can halt the rapid destruction of the world's forests, atmosphere, oceans, and species?

A large asteroid might hit the planet, as is believed to have occurred 65 million years ago, but this is unlikely to happen within the near future. Disease and famine could wipe out large numbers of human beings in an overpopulated world, but the more advanced nations are struggling to ensure that this does not happen, and that the disastrous global population explosion continues unabated. It is clear that HIV/AIDS will not stop the population explosion – it is not even stopping it in Africa, where in places prevalence rates reach twenty-five percent, although a real killer plague could certainly wipe out vast swathes of mankind.

And war? Small wars, such as the scores of small conflicts that continue year after year, are no match for the ongoing population explosion, especially as the average age of the population continues to decline and the percentage of the population of reproductive age increases each year. Not even major wars, such as the First and Second World Wars, have had a long-term impact on the growth of the human population. But a really big war, involving thousands of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction could make a real difference. Such a war could destroy huge numbers of people and bring an immediate halt to the large-scale industrial activity that is causing so much environmental degeneration. It could reduce human numbers to the point where they no longer have a significant impact on the planet's ecology. Many species other than man would also be adversely affected, but in many cases they are doomed to eventual extinction by human industrial activity even in the absence of such warfare. Nuclear proliferation *is* taking place, as also the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. No matter how hard

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the U.S. strives to prevent it, as population pressures exacerbate political tensions, a future war employing unprecedented quantities of weapons of mass destruction seems virtually assured at some time in the twenty-first century.

An attack involving 1,000 nuclear bombs can destroy about three quarters of the total urban population of the world, and an attack using 1,000 such weapons is of modest size. One thousand nuclear bombs could be produced, for example, with just the amount of plutonium that the nuclear powers have lost track of. At the present time, the U.S. possesses about 12,000 nuclear warheads and the former states of the USSR possess 22,500, of which about 7,000 on each side are classified as "strategic." Under the START II arms reduction treaty, the number of strategic nuclear weapons would be halved, to about 3,500 deployable warheads each for the US and Russia by the end of 2007. Either of these stockpiles is sufficient to destroy all 3,385 cities with a population of 100,000 people or more. Meanwhile, China is rapidly building its own arsenal, and other countries such as Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea are following suit.[6]

Scenario for the Post-Nuclear War Age

It would appear that catastrophic nuclear-age war is inevitable, for several reasons. A major factor is the "politics of envy" – the desire for the "have-nots" of the world to destroy what the "haves" have, even if it does not improve their situation. The gap between the industrialized "West" and the rest of the world is widening, and the hatred and envy are growing as the poorer nations realize that they will never catch up. With the proliferation of plutonium from nuclear reactors, terrorists and rogue nations will soon have the capability to produce thousands of suitcase-sized nuclear bombs, and deliver them to any cities in the world. No missiles or airplanes are required. In terms of feasibility, likelihood, and effectiveness, global nuclear war or some other form of conflict utilizing weapons of mass destruction appears to "dominate" all other likely solutions to human overpopulation and man-made ecological destruction.

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[6] For detailed information on nuclear weapon stockpiles, refer to the Internet web sites http://www.cdi.org (Center for Defense Information) and http://www.nrdc.org (Natural Resources Defense Council).

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Given the apparent inevitability of global nuclear war, the issue must be addressed: what preparations should be made for it. The following are proposed. First, make preparations such that if and when global nuclear war does occur, it will be possible to establish a sustainable population. Second, assemble a collection of all of the world's knowledge. Replicate the collection and store it in various hidden locations around the world, to minimize the chance of its extinction. Third, take steps to preserve the planet's biodiversity, such as storing seeds in many secret locations[7] and establishing ecologically viable safe zones (large reserves) of sufficient size to ensure the survival of the world's disappearing larger species. Protection of plant genetic material (seeds) and small animals appears feasible, but the options for saving large species (e.g., apes, tigers, rhinoceros) from extinction are limited in the current economics-driven world.

Sustainable Human Population Size

Assuming that some human beings survive the apocalypse, it is of interest to address the question of how large a human population is likely to be sustainable. Over the years, a fair amount of effort has been invested in trying to determine an "optimal" human population size for Earth. *In Can America Survive?* I suggest that an industrial society of five million people and a primitive rural (hunter-gatherer) population of five million may be sustainable. Very briefly, the rationale for these numbers is as follows.

For millions of years, Earth supported a hunter-gatherer hominid population estimated to be about five million in size. That size and type of population is the only one that has proved sustainable in the long term. When agriculture was developed, the planet was able to support 300 million to 500 million people. Careful analysis (Reference 5)[8] shows that 500 million people is about all that can be supported by solar energy – today's population of six billion was achieved because of the use of fossil fuels, which will soon

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[7] See "Time Travelers on Ice" by Helen Gibson Ardingly in *Time*, January 17, 2000 for an article on Kew Gardens' new seed bank.

[8] See also, "Natural Resources and an Optimum Human Population" by David Pimentel et al., *Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1994, Human Sciences Press, Inc.

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be depleted (oil and natural gas within 50 years, coal somewhat later).

In Reference 1, an "optimal" human population is defined as the *smallest* population that can be maintained for a long period of time. The objective is to reduce the planetary impact of mankind to the lowest level possible, while at the same time keeping the human numbers sufficiently high and dispersed to reduce the likelihood of extinction to a low level. I visualize (see Reference 1) a sustainable global population comprised of two parts – a single industrially advanced nation of five million and a rural hunter-gatherer population of five million, dispersed over the Earth. The rationale for specifying a size of five million for the industrial population is that, because industrial populations consume about 100 times as much energy as nonindustrial populations, that number is all that the solar energy budget of the planet can support.[9]

The purpose of the widely spread rural population is to reduce the chance of human extinction from a cataclysmic event that might exterminate a geographically concentrated industrial population. The role of the single-nation industrial population is to protect the rural population and regulate the size of the global population.

The approach based on Reference 1 to determining an "optimal" human population size and character is quite different from approaches proposed earlier. Previous approaches attempted to *maximize* the number of human beings on the planet, and mainly ignored the dangers of large human populations to the planet's ecology and environment. The proposed approach views that it is the

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[9] Recall that the planet can support at most 500 million people on solar energy at a very low-energy level of living. High-technology (industrial) man utilizes about 100 times as much energy as low-technology (hunter-gatherer) man. (People in advanced industrial nations consume about 2,500 – 8,000 kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe) per capita per annum of commercial energy. People in poor nations consume as little as one-hundredth of that amount.) Hence the planet's solar energy "budget" can support 500 million low-energy-consuming human beings, or 5 million high-energy-consuming human beings, or any mix that satisfies the equation: number of low-energy-consuming people + 100(number of high-energy-consuming people) = 500 million.

Historically, the planet's biosphere experienced little stress from a hunter-gatherer population of 5 million, so let us assume a global hunter-gatherer population of size equal to that number. In this case, the number of industrial (high-energy-consuming) people that can also be supported by solar energy is: (500 million – 5 million)/100 = 4.95 million, or 5 million.

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planet's resources (land, water, solar energy, biosphere), not mankind, that determines the maximal size of human population, and that mankind will survive in the long term only if it makes minimal impact on the biosphere. The issue then is to determine a human population size and character that has a negligible impact on the biosphere, while at the same time is sufficiently large and of a character that it has a high chance of long-term survival. Under this approach, the objective is to determine the *minimal*-sized human population that has a good chance of long-term survival. Based on experience to date, the previous approach of attempting to maximize the size of the human population, with the concomitant macroscopic changes that this causes to the ecology and environment of the biosphere, is a prescription for disaster.

With respect to establishing a sustainable population, it would appear that time is of the essence. The longer the passage of time before mankind establishes a sustainable population (i.e., one that exists in harmony (equilibrium) with the rest of the biosphere), the less there is to save. With each passing year under mankind's current global industrial regime, more species are extinguished and the diversity of the biosphere decreases. Eventually, mankind will establish a sustainable population (whether by choice or by force of nature), or it will cease to exist. If it survives for the long term, the only real outstanding issue is what kind of world it will inhabit – one with an abundant variety of life that evolved over millions of years, or one that is sadly deprived of many of its interesting, and possibly necessary, species.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Cultural Amnesia: America's Future and the Crisis of Memory
Stephen Bertman
Praeger Publishers, 2000

The six Regents universities in Kansas host a summer academy for the top high school graduates before they go on to college. It rotates among the universities, and comes to Wichita State University, where this reviewer teaches, every six years.

During the summer three years ago, I was invited to be one of the academy's speakers in a panel on "Racism in America." In my opening talk, I sought to place the racial experience of the United States into historical context. My message essentially was that the presence of slavery, brought in by the slave trade, had run counter to the central *ethos* of American sensibility, which was powerfully oriented toward the Enlightenment. It was Britain, with its navy, that abolished the slave trade, responding also to the classical liberalism that predominated in its thinking. It wasn't long before slavery itself was abolished. The century and a third since that time has not been easy, but has marked the efforts of a society, again moved predominantly by humane instincts, to grapple with difficult human issues.

My remarks were followed by those of a vivacious, highly articulate "black activist." She excoriated virtually everything about "a racist United States," and was eloquent in her complaints of "victimization." She was followed by a black state senator, who mildly seconded her point of view and devoted most of his attention to refuting mine. The fourth panelist was a conservative from Pakistan who did a much more effective job than I did of countering the charges of American "racism."

During the question and discussion period, the response by the thirty or so students present was revealing. Unanimously, they were vehement in support of the activist's attacks on the United States; and no one voiced any sympathy whatsoever with the perspective I had presented. The three or four black students among them were asked by the activist whether they thought of themselves primarily as

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black or primarily as American, and they all answered, "black."

What this episode illustrates is the enormity and success of the ideological attack that has been made on American institutions and ideals by the alienated intellectual culture that has, virtually without rebuttal, reached this generation of students through the schools they have attended. The image of the United States that I grew up with is not only obsolete, it is held in contempt. There is no "cultural memory" of the United States as a decent, humane and classically liberal repository of the best aspirations of humanity. The emphasis is entirely on negative factors, seen with hindsight, without any historical context, and with an outraged, alienated emphasis.

In any discussion of the loss of cultural continuity and consensus in the United States today, it is indispensable to take into account the profound alienation of the artistic-literary culture for as far back as the 1820s. The alienation against mainstream America began long before the counter-cultural years of the 1960s. Another factor, of increasing importance, is the role of immigration. Within the past few weeks, three delightful students in my classes – two from Vietnam and one from China – have obtained their American citizenship. It is highly doubtful that they are steeped in alienation, but one thing is bound to be true: that their cultural associations and memories have no deeply set continuity with the American past. Vast immigration brings in new memories, new cultural associations, and thus discontinuity so far as a unified American culture is concerned.

Stephen Bertman, in his book *Cultural Amnesia*, does not discuss these things, but enriches our understanding by pointing to other, more existential, forces that are at work to shatter what was once the cultural consensus within the United States. He says that "each day, fewer and fewer of our nation's long-term memories survive." The causal factors that he discusses are summed up when he says: "The long passage of time, the urgent call of the senses, the accelerating power of technology, the lure of materialism, and the newness of our nation have all collaborated in obscuring the past and its meaning." Science, he says, challenges the validity of age-old traditions, while technology shows that antiquated things deserve to be replaced. Materialism "demeans subjects that can't be converted into cash." Education is focusing on job-preparation, which forces out the humanities.

As in his book *Hyperculture: The Human Cost of Speed* (Praeger,

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1998), Bertman, a professor of Language, Literatures and Cultures at the University of Windsor in Canada, makes the account especially interesting by classical references and relevant background information. He begins and ends the book by telling of Homer's Ulysses, whose memories of his experiences during the ten years following the Trojan War, and his longing for return to his home and family in Ithaca, were recounted in *The Odyssey*. Bertman also spices the discussion of cultural amnesia with a detailed review of how memory works within the human brain, telling of the brain's physiology and about the various forms of amnesia. Perhaps most relevant is his account of how civilization establishes memory through oral traditions, language, writing, books, libraries, ruins, statues, and the like. He finds disturbing the rapid loss of monuments around the world because of pollution, and the deterioration of films.

The fact that Bertman seems unaware of the ideological "culture war" could be reason to discount his writing, but it would make better sense to listen to what he has to tell us about the forces that he does see at work. They are themselves of sufficient weight to make problematic the entire continuity of culture, not just of American culture but of any culture that is subject to the same forces (as all are, to one degree or another, today). We are "as the flies of summer."

Dwight D. Murphey

A Republic, Not an Empire
Patrick J. Buchanan
Regnery Publishing, Inc. 1999

Patrick Buchanan was a senior White House adviser to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan; has long been a political commentator, syndicated columnist and television panelist; is the author of four books; and is in 2000 making his third run for the presidency, for which he recently moved to the Reform Party.

A Republic, Not an Empire devotes several chapters to a review of American foreign policy going back to Washington's first administration. Its scholarship, grasp of essential facts, and easy readability make it an ideal primer on a central feature of American

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history. A strength over most other works is that Buchanan, as an independent thinker, sees many things that orthodox histories omit. (An example is his simple observation that the British-American blockade of Germany was continued for many months after the armistice in November 1918, causing hundreds of thousands to die of starvation. The importance of such a fact, which others usually don't mention even in a footnote, is that it, in combination with a number of other things, set the stage for Hitler in Germany).

More than anything, however, the book is valuable both for its broad themes and its specific ideas. Its leading theme is that the United States, while certainly not "isolationist" in any true sense, managed to eschew interventionism in the affairs of other countries from the founding of the country in 1789 until finally the country embraced imperialism in 1898. Even though the public soon became disenchanted with imperialism itself, the impulse toward interventionist overreach was a major feature of America's relations with other countries in the twentieth century. Often this impulse has come from a globalist idealism that has sought to set the world straight along the lines of democracy, free trade and of pressure toward world government. Other times, it has stemmed from a unilateralist sense of America's hegemonic power and influence, whereby American superpower status would itself work wonders. Buchanan sees the interventionism as fraught with danger, and calls instead for an "enlightened nationalism" that will assess what is truly in America's "vital interest" (things people are willing to die for) and intervene only with regard to them, quite deliberately staying out of everything else. Among many other grounds for objection to rampant interventionism, he mentions that in an age of growing potential for nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism it invites national tragedy to make oneself feared and despised by the upholders of other nations and cultures all over the world. The United States, he argues, can cut down on that fear by minding its own business, and satisfying itself with being an example to the world of how a free society works.

A second theme has to do with maintaining American sovereignty as against the continuing pressure to subordinate sovereignty to the institutions of an incipient world government. Buchanan's realism does not allow him to think the world is constituted in such a way that American lives, fortunes and liberties can safely be subordinated

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to externally-made decisions.

His two main themes, accordingly, run counter to received opinion today; i.e., to the opinion held by America's and the "world community's" dominant opinion-forming elite. That would be enough to cause a pointing with alarm. An added feature of the book, though, is that it contains many specific insights that are as provocative as the main themes. Buchanan is relentlessly honest, although there is no tone of having a chip on his shoulder.

He builds a strong case for not intervening around the world on humanitarian grounds. This is supported by important prudential reasons, and also by any number of historic precedents. When Stalin deliberately starved millions during the winter of 1932-3 to force the collectivization of agriculture and to repress nationalist movements, the world hardly took notice (and continues not to notice, except in a book like Buchanan's). Mao's mass murder (an estimated 30 million in the Great Leap Forward alone) hardly blemished Mao's reputation, much less elicited intervention. There was no intervention, either, to stop Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia; and Buchanan's list goes on. That such things are even mentioned is extraordinary and valuable.

What has drawn Buchanan the most criticism has been his willingness to fly in the face of the virtually ubiquitous American conviction since Pearl Harbor that the entry of the United States into World War II against Hitler was a noble and necessary crusade. Buchanan sides with the overwhelming consensus held by Americans before Pearl Harbor. Despite all the criticism he has taken, it is worth reflecting that Buchanan's position is entirely rational – hardly the rantings of a vicious man, as is so often suggested. He observes that when Britain and France gave their guarantee to Poland, they were guaranteeing something they had no conceivable power to enforce; and that it would have been much better for them if they had refrained from war with Hitler and had spent several years building their own military strength while Hitler exhausted his against the Soviet Union. He also observes that after the "Battle of Britain" had been won to frustrate Hitler's ambition to invade across the Channel and Hitler had become absorbed in a vast war on the Eastern Front leading to his defeat at Stalingrad, it was especially untimely for the United States to enter the war against Hitler (and in alliance with Stalin) rather than, again, to build up its own strength

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militarily and economically. Only blindness to the blood on Stalin's hands (of his own people and of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the eastern half of Poland) can allow Americans to feel that there was a moral imperative to intervene and that the war was all about "the forces of good against the forces of evil."

There is much more mentioned in *A Republic, Not an Empire*. A reader who brings thought, not prejudice, to the book will be rewarded not just by these, but by many other, reflections.

There are a few things, perhaps, to criticize. Buchanan, for example, has apparently not found occasion to question the claims made about the "interning of 110,000 Japanese-Americans." No doubt he will speak the truth about that as forcefully when he does find time to investigate it independently as he does about so many other subjects. This reviewer finds it odd, too, that he doesn't mention the great strategic question in Europe during World War II, which was whether the Western Allies were going to let the Red Army reach eastern Europe and Germany before they did. This is a major omission from his discussion of that war. Buchanan would have been hard pressed, though, to include in a book of readable length a discussion of everything that arguably should be included.

Buchanan has perhaps not exhausted his subject, but he has written a book that raises issues of critical importance to the survival and future well-being of the United States.

Dwight D. Murphey

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